# ASU Round 6 Cards

## 1NC

### FW

#### A. Our interpretation is that the affirmative should have to instrumentally defend the institutional implementation of a topical plan.

#### B. Violation – the aff doesn’t defend a plan.

#### C. Best for fairness.

#### 1. Plan focus is the only predictable way of affirming the resolution. Philosophical and theoretical concerns certainly play into the ways that policies are made, but the resolution only calls for us to defend and/or question political-institutional implementations of these kinds of concerns.

#### 2. Plan focus is the only way to ensure a fair division of ground. The affirmative has the advantage of trying to solve the most heinous problems of the status quo—without plan focus, debates devolve into whether or not things like racism, sexism, classism, or homophobia are good or bad. While problems are often less contestable, solutions to these problems are—we can debate about whether or not a particular proposal will fix or worsen these problems and proffer our own solutions.

#### 3. Switch side solves all your offense. You can read your K on the negative. Solves all your offense and preserves our ground.

#### D. Best for education:

#### 1. The political *is* value to life—it is how originally solipsistic lives become incarnate and real to themselves.

Arendt 1958 [Hannah, *The Human Condition*, pp. 196-199]

The original, prephilosophic Greek remedy for this frailty had been the foundation of the polis. The polis, as it grew out of and remained rooted in the Greek pre-polis experience and estimate of what makes it worthwhile for men to live together (syzen), namely, the "sharing of words and deeds,"26 had a twofold function. First, it was intended to enable men to do permanently, albeit under certain restrictions, what otherwise had been possible only as an extraordinary and infrequent enterprise for which they had to leave their households. The polis was supposed to multiply the occasions to win "immortal fame," that is, to multiply the chances for everybody to distinguish himself, to show in deed and word who he was in his unique distinctness. One, if not the chief, reason for the incredible development of gift and genius in Athens, as well as for the hardly less surprising swift decline of the city-state, was precisely that from beginning to end its foremost aim was to make the extraordinary an ordinary occurrence of everyday life. The second function of the polls, again closely connected with the hazards of action as experienced before its coming into being, was to offer a remedy for the futility of action and speech; for the chances that a deed deserving fame would not be forgotten, that it actually would become "immortal," were not very good. Homer was not only a shining example of the poet's political function, and therefore the "educator of all Hellas"; the very fact that so great an enterprise as the Trojan War could have been forgotten without a poet to immortalize it several hundred years later offered only too good an example of what could happen to human greatness if it had nothing but poets to rely on for its permanence. We are not concerned here with the historical causes for the rise of the Greek city-state; what the Greeks themselves thought of it and its ralson d'etre, they have made unmistakably clear. The polis-—if we trust the famous words of Pericles in the Funeral Oration—gives a guaranty that those who forced every sea and land to become the scene of their daring will not remain without witness and will need neither Homer nor anyone else who knows how to turn words to praise them; without assistance from others, those who acted will be able to establish together the everlasting remembrance of their good and bad deeds, to inspire admiration in the present and in future ages.27 In other words, men's life together in the form of the polis seemed to assure that the most futile of human activities, action and speech, and the least tangible and most ephemeral of man-made "products," the deeds and stories which are their outcome, would become imperishable. The organization of the polis, physically secured by the wall around the city and physiognomically guaranteed by its laws—lest the succeeding generations change its identity beyond recognition is a kind of organized remembrance. It assures the mortal actor that his passing existence and fleeting greatness will never lack the reality that comes from being seen, being heard, and, generally, appearing before an audience of fellow men, who outside the polis could attend only the short duration of the performance and therefore needed Homer and "others of his craft" in order to be presented to those who were not there. According to this self-interpretation, the political realm rises directly out of acting together, the "sharing of words and deeds." Thus action not only has the most intimate relationship to the public part of the world common to us all, but is the one activity which constitutes it. It is as though the wall of the polis and the boundaries of the law were drawn around an already existing public space which, however, without such stabilizing protection could not endure, could not survive the moment of action and speech itself. Not historically, of course, but speaking metaphorically and theoretically, it is as though the men who returned from the Trojan War had wished to make permanent the space of action which had arisen from their deeds and sufferings, to prevent its perishing with their dispersal and return to their isolated homesteads. The polis, properly speaking, is not the city-state in its physical location; it is the organization of the people as it arises out of acting and speaking together, and its true space lies between people living together for this purpose, no matter where they happen to be. "Wherever you go, you will be a polis": these famous words became not merely the watchword of Greek colonization, they expressed the conviction that action and speech create a space between the participants which can find its proper location almost any time and anywhere. It is the space of appearance in the widest sense of the word, namely, the space where I appear to others as others appear to me, where men exist not merely like other living or inanimate things but make their appearance explicitly. This space does not always exist, and although all men are capable of deed and word, most of them—like the slave, the foreigner, and the barbarian in antiquity, like the laborer or craftsman prior to the modern age, the jobholder or businessman in our world—do not live in it. No man, moreover, can live in it all the time. To be deprived of it means to be deprived of reality, which, humanly and politically speaking, is the same as appearance. To men the reality of the world is guaranteed by the presence of others, by its appearing to all; "for what appears to all, this we call Being,"28 and whatever lacks this appearance comes and passes away like a dream, intimately and exclusively our own but without reality.29

#### 2. No solvency for their critique without institutional focus. We must try to change policy in order to change the world—the concentration of power in the hands of political elites is inevitable, so we must work within that system to check oppression and violence.

Themba-Nixon 2k [Makani, Executive Director of the Praxis Project, *Colorlines* 3.2, pg. 12]

The flourish and passion with which she made the distinction said everything. Policy is for wonks, sell-out politicians, and ivory-tower eggheads. Organizing is what real, grassroots people do. Common as it may be, this distinction doesn't bear out in the real world. Policy is more than law. It is any written agreement (formal or informal) that specifies how an institution, governing body, or community will address shared problems or attain shared goals. It spells out the terms and the consequences of these agreements and is the codification of the body's values-as represented by those present in the policymaking process. Given who's usually present, most policies reflect the political agenda of powerful elites. Yet, policy can be a force for change-especially when we bring our base and community organizing into the process. In essence, policies are the codification of power relationships and resource allocation. Policies are the rules of the world we live in. Changing the world means changing the rules. So, if organizing is about changing the rules and building power, how can organizing be separated from policies? Can we really speak truth to power, fight the right, stop corporate abuses, or win racial justice without contesting the rules and the rulers, the policies and the policymakers? The answer is no-and double no for people of color. Today, racism subtly dominates nearly every aspect of policymaking. From ballot propositions to city funding priorities, policy is increasingly about the control, de-funding, and disfranchisement of communities of color. What Do We Stand For? Take the public conversation about welfare reform, for example. Most of us know it isn't really about putting people to work. The right's message was framed around racial stereotypes of lazy, cheating "welfare queens" whose poverty was "cultural." But the new welfare policy was about moving billions of dollars in individual cash payments and direct services from welfare recipients to other, more powerful, social actors. Many of us were too busy to tune into the welfare policy drama in Washington, only to find it washed up right on our doorsteps. Our members are suffering from workfare policies, new regulations, and cutoffs. Families who were barely getting by under the old rules are being pushed over the edge by the new policies. Policy doesn't get more relevant than this. And so we got involved in policy-as defense. Yet we have to do more than block their punches. We have to start the fight with initiatives of our own. Those who do are finding offense a bit more fun than defense alone. Living wage ordinances, youth development initiatives, even gun control and alcohol and tobacco policies are finding their way onto the public agenda, thanks to focused community organizing that leverages power for community-driven initiatives. -ZX Over 600 local policies have been passed to regulate the tobacco industry. Local coalitions have taken the lead by writing ordinances that address local problems and organizing broad support for them. - Nearly 100 gun control and violence prevention policies have been enacted since 1991. - Milwaukee, Boston, and Oakland are among the cities that have passed living wage ordinances: local laws that guarantee higher than minimum wages for workers, usually set as the minimum needed to keep a family of four above poverty. These are just a few of the examples that demonstrate how organizing for local policy advocacy has made inroads in areas where positive national policy had been stalled by conservatives. Increasingly, the local policy arena is where the action is and where activists are finding success. Of course, corporate interests-which are usually the target of these policies-are gearing up in defense. Tactics include front groups, economic pressure, stand for takes place in the shaping of demands. By getting into the policy arena in a proactive manner, we can take our demands to the next level. Our demands can become law, with real consequences if the agreement is broken. After all the organizing, press work, and effort, a group should leave a decisionmaker with more than a handshake and his or her word. Of course, this work requires a certain amount of interaction with "the suits," as well as struggles with the bureaucracy, the technical language, and the all-too-common resistance by decisionmakers. Still, if it's worth demanding, it's worth having in writing-whether as law, regulation, or internal policy. From ballot initiatives on rent control to laws requiring worker protections, organizers are leveraging their power into written policies that are making a real difference in their communities. Of course, policy work is just one tool in our organizing arsenal, but it is a tool we simply can't afford to ignore. Making policy work an integral part of organizing will require a certain amount of retrofitting. We will need to develop the capacity to translate our information, data, and experience into stories that are designed to affect the public conversation. Perhaps most important, we will need to move beyond fighting problems and on to framing solutions that bring us closer to our vision of how things should be. And then we must be committed to making it so.

#### 3. Favoring personal experience as an intrinsically valid, nonfalsifiable gesture fails – their notion of liberation is an illusion that prevents real change

Gur-Ze’ev 98 (Ilan Senior Lecturer at the Faculty of Education, University of Haifa, Israel 1998 “Toward a Non-Repressive Critical Pedagogy,” http://construct.haifa.ac.il/~ilangz/Critpe39.html)

**From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by Critical Pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of “feelings”, “experience”, and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical Pedagogy**, in its different versions, **claims to inhere and overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment’s emancipatory and ethnocentric arrogance**, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. **Marginalized** feminist **knowledge**, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education. This knowledge **is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function “successfully”.** However, **neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. “Truth” is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of “difference” take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence**. My argument is that **the marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of the weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationalism, and ethnocentrism declines into uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge, which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting “the truth”**, “the facts”, or “the real interests of the group” - even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. **This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on “facts” of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.**  **These conceptions are all historical, and do not take seriously the present Western system’s capacity for shaping all collective consciousness**, not only the ruling group’s. **The inner logic of the system is not relevant solely for the center. The system is to be understood as a complex of specific power relations and symbolic dynamics that contains and allows the potentials and limitations of groups and individuals**, identities and interests, conceptual possibilities, and economic-technological realities. **Within these limits, every element of the system is set, regulated, and activated, thereby receiving its “meaning” and aims.** This is the case from the level of the different elements of the psyche to the level of the global sub-systems of production, mobilization, distribution, and conquest. It is made possible by the formation of social, economic, and technological circumstances, as well as by conscious and the psychic ones, which are all contained within the limits of the present order of things. On the one hand**, the premises and practices of current standard Critical Pedagogy, by emphasizing the knowledge of marginalized people** (not necessarily marginalized knowledge), **might look like the realization of Foucault’s understanding of truth/power and the recognition that “each society has its regimes of truth....that is, the types of discourse which it accepts and makes function as true”**.(64) On the other hand, **even from a Foucaultian perspective, the optimism of standard Critical Pedagogy neither recognizes nor challenges Foucault’s common ground with Critical Theory’s conceptions when he writes that “knowledge is also the field of coordination and subordination of statements in which concepts appear and are defined, applied and transformed...”.(**65) Deciphering these ways of constructing reality, identity, knowledge, and conceptual possibilities on a historical local and general level might release one from easy optimistic reliance on the vitalism that is implicitly understood to be contained in the alternative knowledge of the marginalized. **A pedagogy that overemphasizes the importance of the effectiveness of revolutionary praxis and whose yardstick is power is not to be counted as part of Critical Education** or Critical Pedagogy. A Critical Pedagogy that does not suffer from these weaknesses must present itself as an elaboration of the possibility of an alternative spirituality, and as part of an effort to transcend reality and the present realm of self-evidence.

### Cap

#### The affirmative commodifies an essentialized notion of race to frame inequality, replicating racism and shattering class-based coalitions, ensuring the capitalist social relations that build the ghettoes and favells that imprison racialized populations become inevitable, turning the case

Darder and Torres 99 (Antonia Darder, Professor of Educational Policy Studies and Latino/a Studies at the University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign, and Rodolpho D. Torres, Professor of Planning, Policy & Design and Political Science at UC Irvine, “Shattering the ‘Race’ Lens: Toward a Critical Theory of Racism”, Chapter 7 of the book “Critical Ethnicity: Countering the Waves of Identity Politics”, edited by Robert H. Tai and Mary L. Kenyatta, p. 174-176)

Over the last three decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency among social science scholars to focus on notions of “race.” Over the last three decades, there has been an overwhelming tendency among a variety of critical scholars to focus on the concept of "race" as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality and marginalization.’ As a consequence, much of the literature on subordinate cultural populations, with its emphasis on such issues as "racial inequality," "racial segregation," "racial identity," has utilized the construct of "race" as a central category of analysis for interpreting the social conditions of inequality and marginalization. ln turn, this literature has reinforced a racialized politics of identity and representation, with its problematic emphasis on "racial" identity as the overwhelming impulse for political action. This theoretical practice has led to serious analytical weaknesses and absence of depth in much of the historical and contemporary writings on racialized populations in this country. The politics of busing in the early 1970s provides an excellent example that illustrates this phenomenon. Social scientists studying "race relations" concluded that contact among "Black" and "White" students would improve "race relations" and the educational conditions of "Black" students if they were bused to "White" (better) schools outside their neighborhoods!” Thirty years later, many parents and educators adamantly denounce the busing solution (a solution based on a discourse of ”race") as not only fundamentally problematic to the fabric of African American and Chicano communities, but an erroneous social policy experiment that failed to substantially improve the overall academic performance of students in these communities. Given this legacy, it is not surprising to find that the theories, practices, and policies that have informed social science analysis of racialized populations today are overwhelmingly rooted in a politics of identity, an approach that is founded on parochial notions of "race" and representation which ignore the imperatives of capitalist accumulation and the existence of class divisions within racialized subordinate populations. The folly of this position is critiqued by Ellen Meiksins Wood in her article entitled "Identity Crisis," where she exposes the limitations of a politics of identity which fails to contend with the fact that capitalism is the most totalizing system of social relations the world has ever known. Yet, in much of the work on African American, Latino, Native American, and Asian populations, an analysis of class and a critique of capitalism is conspicuously absent. And even when it is mentioned, the emphasis is primarily on an undifferentiated plurality of identity politics or an “intersection of oppressions," which, unfortunately, ignores the overwhelming tendency of capitalism to homogenize rather than to diversify human experience. Moreover, this practice is particularly disturbing since no matter where one travels around the world, there is no question that racism is integral to the process of capital accumulation. For example, the current socioeconomic conditions of Latinos and other racialized populations can be traced to the reletless emergence of the global economy and recent economic policies of expansion, such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). A recent United Nations report by the International Labor Organization conﬁrms the negative impact of globalization on racialized populations. By the end of 1998, it was projected that one billion workers would be unemployed. The people of Africa, China, and Latin America have been most affected by the current restructuring of capitalist development.“ This phenomenon of racialized capitalism is directly linked to the abusive practices and destructive impact of the “global factory’ '—a global ﬁnancial enterprise system that includes such transnational corporations as Coca Cola, Walmart, Disney, Ford Motor Company, and General Motors. In a recent speech on "global economic apartheid," John Cavanagh," co-executive director of the Institute for Policy Studies in Washington, D.C., comments on the practices of the Ford Motor Company. The Ford Motor Company has its state-of-the-art assembly plant in Mexico . . . where because it can deny basic worker rights, it can pay one-tenth the wages and yet get the same quality and the same productivity in producing goods. . . .The same technologies by the way which are easing globalization are also primarily cutting more jobs than they're creating. The failure of scholars to confront this dimension in their analysis of contemporary society as a racialized phenomenon and their tendency to continue treating class as merely one of a multiplicity of (equally valid) perspectives, which may or may not "intersect" with the process of racialization, are serious shortcomings. In addressing this issue, we must recognize that identity politics, which generally gloss over class differences and/ or ignore class contradictions, have often been used by radical scholars and activists within African American, Latino, and other subordinate cultural communities in an effort to build a political base. Here, fabricated constructions of "race" are objectified and mediated as truth to ignite political support, divorced from the realities of class struggle. By so doing, they have unwittingly perpetuated the vacuous and dangerous notion that the political and economic are separate spheres of society which can function independently—a view that ﬁrmly anchors and sustains prevailing class relations of power in society.

#### A focus on discourse is an abandonment of real change – we must use a materialist focus to solve oppression

Cloud 1 (Dana L. Cloud, Associate Professor, Communication Studies UT Austin, “The Affirmative Masquerade,” American Communication Journal, Volume 4, Issue 3, Spring 2001, <http://www.acjournal.org/holdings/vol4/iss3/special/cloud.htm>)

At the very least, however, it is clear that **poststructuralist discourse theories have left behind** some of **historical materialism’s most valuable conceptual tools for** any **theoretical and critical practice that aims at informing practical, oppositional political activity on behalf of** historically exploited and **oppressed groups**. As Nancy Hartsock (1983, 1999) and many others have argued (see Ebert 1996; Stabile, 1997; Triece, 2000; Wood, 1999), **we need to retain concepts such as standpoint epistemology** (wherein truth standards are not absolute or universal but arise from the scholar’s alignment with the perspectives of particular classes and groups) **and fundamental, class-based interests** (as opposed to understanding class as just another discursively-produced identity). We need extra-discursive reality checks on ideological mystification and economic contextualization of discursive phenomena. Most importantly, **critical scholars bear the obligation to explain the origins and causes of exploitation and oppression in order** better **to inform the fight against them**.  In poststructuralist discourse theory, **the "retreat from class**" (Wood, 1999) **expresses an unwarranted pessimism about what can be accomplished in late capitalism with regard to** understanding and **transforming** system and **structure at the level of the economy and the state**. **It** substitutes meager cultural freedoms for macro-level social transformation even **as millions of people around the world feel the global reach of capitalism more deeply than ever before**. At the core of the issue is a debate across the humanities and social sciences with regard to whether we live in a "new economy," an allegedly postmodern, information-driven historical moment in which, it is argued, organized mass movements are no longer effective in making material demands of system and structure (Melucci, 1996). In suggesting that global capitalism has so innovated its strategies that there is no alternative to its discipline, arguments proclaiming "a new economy" risk inaccuracy, pessimism, and conservatism (see Cloud, in press). While a thoroughgoing summary is beyond the scope of this essay, there is a great deal of evidence against claims that capitalism has entered a new phase of extraordinary innovation, reach, and scope (see Hirst and Thompson, 1999).  Furthermore, both class polarization (see Mishel, Bernstein, and Schmitt, 2001) and the ideological and management strategies that contain class antagonism (see Cloud, 1998; Parker and Slaughter, 1994) still resemble their pre-postmodern counterparts. A recent report of the Economic Policy Institute concludes that in the 1990s, inequality between rich and poor in the U.S. (as well as around the world) continued to grow, in a context of rising worker productivity, a longer work week for most ordinary Americans, and continued high poverty rates.  Even as the real wage of the median CEO rose nearly 63 percent from 1989, to 1999, more than one in four U.S. workers lives at or below the poverty level. Among these workers, women are disproportionately represented, as are Black and Latino workers. (Notably, unionized workers earn nearly thirty percent more, on average, than non-unionized workers.) Meanwhile, Disney workers sewing t-shirts and other merchandise in Haiti earn 28 cents an hour. Disney CEO Michael Eisner made nearly six hundred million dollars in 1999--451,000 times the wage of the workers under his employ (Roesch, 1999). According to United Nations and World Bank sources, several trans-national corporations have assets larger than several countries combined. Sub-Saharan Africa and the Russian Federation have seen sharp economic decline, while assets of the world’s top three billionaires exceed the GNP of all of the least-developed countries and their combined population of 600 million people (Shawki and D’Amato, 2000, pp. 7-8).  **In this context of a real** (and clearly bipolar) **class divide in** late **capitalist society,** the postmodern party is a masquerade ball, in which theories claiming to offer ways toward emancipation and progressive critical practice in fact **encourage scholars** and/as activists **to abandon** any **commitment to crafting oppositional political blocs** with instrumental and perhaps revolutionary potential. Instead, on their arguments, we must recognize agency as an illusion of humanism and settle for playing with our identities in a mood of irony, excess, and profound skepticism. Marx and Engels’ critique of the Young Hegelians applies equally well to the postmodern discursive turn: "They are only fighting against ‘phrases.’ They forget, however, that to these phrases they themselves are only opposing other phrases, and that they are in no way combating the real existing world when they are merely combating the phrases of this world" (1976/1932, p. 41).  Of course, the study of "phrases" is important to the project of materialist critique in the field of rhetoric. The point, though, is to explain the connections between phrases on the one hand and economic interests and systems of oppression and exploitation on the other. Marxist ideology critique, understands that classes, motivated by class interest, produce rhetorics wittingly and unwittingly, successfully and unsuccessfully. Those rhetorics are strategically adapted to context and audience. Yet **Marxist theory is not naïve in** its **understanding** of intention or individual **agency**. Challenging individualist humanism, **Marxist** ideology **critics regard people as "products of circumstances**" (and changed people as products of changed circumstances; Marx, 1972b/1888, p. 144).  Within this understanding, **Marxist** ideology **critics can describe and evaluate cultural discourses** such as that of racism or sexism **as strategic and complex expressions of both their moment in history and of their class basis**. Further, this mode of critique seeks to explain both why and how social reality is fundamentally, systematically oppressive and exploitative, exploring not only the surface of discourses but also their often-complex and multi-vocal motivations and consequences. As Burke (1969/1950) notes, **Marxism is both a method of rhetorical criticism and a rhetorical formation** itself (pp. 109-110). There is no pretense of neutrality or assumption of transcendent position for the critic.  Teresa Ebert (1996) summarizes the purpose of materialist ideology critique:   Materialist critique is a mode of knowing that inquires into what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives. It shows that apparently disconnected zones of culture are in fact materially linked through the highly differentiated, mediated, and dispersed operation of a systematic logic of exploitation. In sum, materialist critique disrupts **‘what is’ to explain how social differences**--specifically gender, race, sexuality, and class--**have been systematically produced and continue to operate within regimes of exploitation, so that we can change them. It is the means for** producing transformative knowledges**.** (p. 7)

#### Embracing “experience” as the basis for epistemology ignores the mediated nature of experience. Experience is just another site for articulating the dominant ideology because it ignores the historical continuity of class domination in favor of a “local” understanding of oppression.

Young 6 (Robert, Red Critique, Winter/Spring, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>)

Bourgeois philosophical assumptions haunt the Afrocentric project and, in the domain of black feminist theory, Patricia Hill Collins provides an instructive example of this intersection. In Black Feminist Thought, Collins posits the "special angle of vision" that black women bring to knowledge production process (21), and this "unique angle" (22) provides the "standpoint" for Afrocentric feminism, a feminism that she equates with humanism (37). Similar to the experiential metaphysics of Black women's standpoint theory, Collins also situates Afrocentric feminist epistemology "in the everyday experiences of African-American women" (207). Consequently, Collins suggests that "concrete experience" constitutes a criterion of meaning (208). However, the experiential, the "real", does not adequate the "truth", as Collins implies. Collins rejects the "Eurocentric Masculinist Knowlege Validation Process" for its positivism but, in turn, she offers empiricism as the grounds for validating experience. Hence, the validity of experiential claims is adjudicated by reference to the experience. Not only is her argument circular, but it also undermines one of her key claims. If race, class, gender, and the accompanying ideological apparatuses are interlocking systems of oppression, as Collins suggest, then the experiential is not the site for the "true" but rather the site for the articulation of dominant ideology. On what basis then, could the experiential provide grounds for an historical understanding of the structures that make experience itself possible as experience? Asante and Collins assume that experience is self-intelligible and in their discourse it functions as the limit text of the real. However, I believe experience is a highly mediated frame of understanding. Though it is true that a person of color experiences oppression, this experience is not self-explanatory and, therefore, it needs to be situated in relation to other social practices. Experience seems local but it is, like all cultural and political practices, interrelated to other practices and experiences. Thus its explanation come from its "outside". Theory, specifically Marxist theory, provides an explanation of this outside by reading the meaning of all experiences as determined by the economic realities of class. While Asante's and Collins' humanism reads the experience of race as a site of "self-presence", the history of race in the United States—from slavery to Jim Crow to Katrina—is written in the fundamental difference of class. In other words, experience does not speak the real, but rather it is the site of contradictions and, hence, in need of conceptual elaboration to break from cultural common sense, a conduit for dominant ideology. It is this outside that has come under attack by black (humanist) scholars through the invocation of the black (transcendental) subject.

#### The logic of capitalism results in extinction through the creation of ecological catastrophe and violent imperialist wars that will turn nuclear

Foster 5 [John Bellamy, Monthly Review, September, Vol. 57, Issue 4, “Naked Imperialism”, <http://www.monthlyreview.org/0905jbf.htm>]

From the longer view offered by a historical-materialist critique of capitalism, the direction that would be taken by U.S. imperialism following the fall of the Soviet Union was never in doubt. Capitalism by its very logic is a globally expansive system. The contradiction between its transnational economic aspirations and the fact that politically it remains rooted in particular nation states is insurmountable for the system. Yet, ill-fated attempts by individual states to overcome this contradiction are just as much a part of its fundamental logic. In present world circumstances, when one capitalist state has a virtual monopoly of the means of destruction, the temptation for that state to attempt to seize full-spectrum dominance and to transform itself into the de facto global state governing the world economy is irresistible. As the noted Marxian philosopher István Mészáros observed in Socialism or Barbarism? (2001)—written, significantly, before George W. Bush became president: “[W]hat is at stake today is not the control of a particular part of the planet—no matter how large—putting at a disadvantage but still tolerating the independent actions of some rivals, but the control of its totality by one hegemonic economic and military superpower, with all means—even the most extreme authoritarian and, if needed, violent military ones—at its disposal.” The unprecedented dangers of this new global disorder are revealed in the twin cataclysms to which the world is heading at present: nuclear proliferation and hence increased chances of the outbreak of nuclear war, and planetary ecological destruction. These are symbolized by the Bush administration’s refusal to sign the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty to limit nuclear weapons development and by its failure to sign the Kyoto Protocol as a first step in controlling global warming. As former U.S. Secretary of Defense (in the Kennedy and Johnson administrations) Robert McNamara stated in an article entitled “Apocalypse Soon” in the May–June 2005 issue of Foreign Policy: “The United States has never endorsed the policy of ‘no first use,’ not during my seven years as secretary or since. We have been and remain prepared to initiate the use of nuclear weapons—by the decision of one person, the president—against either a nuclear or nonnuclear enemy whenever we believe it is in our interest to do so.” The nation with the greatest conventional military force and the willingness to use it unilaterally to enlarge its global power is also the nation with the greatest nuclear force and the readiness to use it whenever it sees fit—setting the whole world on edge. The nation that contributes more to carbon dioxide emissions leading to global warming than any other (representing approximately a quarter of the world’s total) has become the greatest obstacle to addressing global warming and the world’s growing environmental problems—raising the possibility of the collapse of civilization itself if present trends continue. The United States is seeking to exercise sovereign authority over the planet during a time of widening global crisis: economic stagnation, increasing polarization between the global rich and the global poor, weakening U.S. economic hegemony, growing nuclear threats, and deepening ecological decline. The result is a heightening of international instability. Other potential forces are emerging in the world, such as the European Community and China,that could eventually challenge U.S. power, regionally and even globally. Third world revolutions, far from ceasing, are beginning to gain momentum again, symbolized by Venezuela’s Bolivarian Revolution under Hugo Chávez. U.S. attempts to tighten its imperial grip on the Middle East and its oil have had to cope with a fierce, seemingly unstoppable, Iraqi resistance, generating conditions of imperial overstretch. With the United States brandishing its nuclear arsenal and refusing to support international agreements on the control of such weapons, nuclear proliferation is continuing. New nations, such as North Korea, are entering or can be expected soon to enter the “nuclear club.” Terrorist blowback from imperialist wars in the third world is now a well-recognized reality, generating rising fear of further terrorist attacks in New York, London, and elsewhere. Such vast and overlapping historical contradictions, rooted in the combined and uneven development of the global capitalist economy along with the U.S. drive for planetary domination, foreshadow what is potentially the most dangerous period in the history of imperialism. The course on which U.S and world capitalism is now headed points to global barbarism—or worse. Yet it is important to remember that nothing in the development of human history is inevitable. There still remains an alternative path—the global struggle for a humane, egalitarian, democratic, and sustainable society. The classic name for such a society is “socialism.” Such a renewed struggle for a world of substantive human equality must begin by addressing the system’s weakest link and at the same time the world’s most pressing needs—by organizing a global resistance movement against the new naked imperialism.

#### The history of slavery proves that race is merely a symptom of capital—any discussion of racism must first start at the violent history of capital accumulation.

Keefer 3 (Tom, member of Facing Reality, New Socialist Magazine, January 2003, “Constructs of Capitalism: Slavery and the Development of Racism”,

<http://www.newsocialist.org/magazine/39/article03.html>, RSR)

The brutality and viciousness of capitalism is well known to the oppressed and exploited of this world. Billions of people throughout the world spend their lives incessantly toiling to enrich the already wealthy, while throughout history any serious attempts to build alternatives to capitalism have been met with bombings, invasions, and blockades by imperialist nation states. Although the modern day ideologues of the mass media and of institutions such as the World Bank and IMF never cease to inveigh against scattered acts of violence perpetrated against their system, they always neglect to mention that the capitalist system they lord over was called into existence and has only been able to maintain itself by the sustained application of systematic violence. It should come as no surprise that this capitalist system, which we can only hope is now reaching the era of its final demise, was just as rapacious and vicious in its youth as it is now. The "rosy dawn" of capitalist production was inaugurated by the process of slavery and genocide in the western hemisphere, and this "primitive accumulation of capital" resulted in the largest systematic murder of human beings ever seen. However, the rulers of society have found that naked force is often most economically used in conjunction with ideologies of domination and control which provide a legitimizing explanation for the oppressive nature of society. Racism is such a construct and it came into being as a social relation which condoned and secured the initial genocidal processes of capitalist accumulation--the founding stones of contemporary bourgeois society. While it is widely accepted that the embryonic capitalist class came to power in the great bourgeois revolutions of the 17th and 18th centuries, what is comparatively less well known is the crucial role that chattel slavery and the plunder of the "New World" played in calling this class into being and providing the "primitive accumulation of capital" necessary to launch and sustain industrialization in Europe. The accidental "discovery" of the Western Hemisphere by the mass murderer Christopher Columbus in 1492 changed everything for the rival economic and political interests of the European states. The looting and pillaging of the "New World" destabilized the European social order, as Spain raised huge armies and built armadas with the unending streams of gold and silver coming from the "New World", the spending of which devalued the currency reserves of its rivals. The only way Portugal, England, Holland, and France could stay ahead in the regional power games of Europe was to embark on their own colonial ventures. In addition to the extraction of precious minerals and the looting and pillaging of indigenous societies, European merchant-adventurers realized that substantial profits could also be made through the production of cash crops on the fertile lands surrounding the Caribbean sea. The only problem was that as the indigenous population either fled from enslavement or perished from the diseases and deprivations of the Europeans, there was no one left to raise the sugar, tobacco, cotton, indigo, and other tropical cash crops that were so profitable. A system of waged labour would not work for the simple reason that with plentiful land and easy means of subsistence surrounding them, colonists would naturally prefer small scale homesteading instead of labouring for their masters. As the planter Emanuel Downing of Massachusetts put it in 1645: "I do not see how we can thrive until we get a stock of slaves sufficient to do all our business, for our children's children will hardly see this great continent filled with people so that our servants will still desire freedom to plant for themselves, and not stay but for very great wages." Capitalistic social relations have always been based on compulsion, and they require as a precondition that workers possess nothing but their capacity to labour. The would-be developers of the wealth of the "New World" thus turned to forced labour in complete contradiction to all the theories of bourgeois economists because unfree labour was the only kind of labour applicable to the concrete situation in the Americas. Although slavery is now, and has almost always been equated with unfree Black labour, it was not always, or even predominantly so. Capitalists looked first to their own societies in order to find the population to labour in servitude on the large-scale plantations necessary for tropical cash crop production. Eric Williams, in his groundbreaking work Capitalism and Slavery, noted that in the early stages of colonialism "white slavery was the historic base upon which Negro [sic] slavery was constructed." Between 1607 and 1783 over a quarter million "white" indentured servants arrived in the British colonies alone where they were set to work in the agricultural and industrial processes of the time. The shipping companies, ports, and trading routes established for the transport of the poor, "criminal", and lumpen elements of European society were to form the backbone of the future slave trade of Africans. Slavery became an exclusively Black institution due to the dynamics of class struggle as repeated multi-ethnic rebellions of African slaves and indentured European servants led the slaveholders to seek strategies to divide and conquer. The fact that an African slave could be purchased for life with the same amount of money that it would cost to buy an indentured servant for 10 years, and that the African's skin color would function as an instrument of social control by making it easier to track down runaway slaves in a land where all whites were free wage labourers and all Black people slaves, provided further incentives for this system of racial classification. In the colonies where there was an insufficient free white population to provide a counterbalance to potential slave insurgencies, such as on the Caribbean islands, an elaborate hierarchy of racial privilege was built up, with the lighter skinned "mulattos" admitted to the ranks of free men where they often owned slaves themselves. The concept of a "white race" never really existed before the economic systems of early capitalism made it a necessary social construct to aid in the repression of enslaved Africans. Xenophobia and hostility towards those who were different than one's own immediate family, clan, or tribe were certainly evident, and discrimination based on religious status was also widespread but the development of modern "scientific" racism with its view that there are physically distinct "races" within humanity, with distinct attributes and characteristics is peculiar to the conquest of the Americas, the rise of slavery, and the imperialist domination of the entire world. Racism provided a convenient way to explain the subordinate position of Africans and other victims of Euro-colonialism, while at the same time providing an apparatus upon which to structure the granting of special privileges to sectors of the working class admitted as members of the "white race". As David McNally has noted, one of the key component of modern racism was its utility in resolving the contradiction as to how the modern European societies in which the bourgeoisie had come to power through promising "freedom" and "equality" were so reliant on slave labour and murderous, yet highly profitable colonial adventures. The development of a concept like racism allowed whole sections of the world's population to be "excommunicated" from humankind, and then be murdered or worked to death with a clear conscience for the profit of the capitalist class. To get a sense of the scale of slavery and its economic importance, and thus an understanding of the material incentives for the creation of ideological constructs such as "race", a few statistics regarding the English slave trade from Eric Williams' book Capitalism and Slavery help to put things in context. The Royal African Company, a monopolistic crown corporation, transported an average of 5 000 slaves a year between 1680 and 1686. When the ability to engage in the free trade of slaves was recognized as a "fundamental and natural right" of the Englishman, one port city alone, Bristol, shipped 160 950 slaves from 1698-1707. In 1760, 146 slave ships with a capacity for 36 000 slaves sailed from British ports, while in 1771 that number had increased to 190 ships with a capacity for 47 000 slaves. Between 1700 and 1786 over 610 000 slaves were imported to Jamaica alone, and conservative estimates for the total import of slaves into all British colonies between 1680 and 1786 are put at over two million. All told, many historians place the total number of Africans displaced by the Atlantic slave trade as being between twelve and thirty million people--a massive historical event and forced migration of unprecedented proportions. These large numbers of slaves and the success of the slave trade as jump starter for capitalist industrialization came from what has been called the "triangular trade"--an intensely profitable economic relationship which built up European industry while systematically deforming and underdeveloping the other economic regions involved. The Europeans would produce manufactured goods that would then be traded to ruling elites in the various African kingdoms. They in turn would use the firearms and trading goods of the Europeans to enrich themselves by capturing members of rival tribes, or the less fortunate of their own society, to sell them as slaves to the European merchants who would fill their now empty ships with slaves destined to work in the colonial plantations. On the plantations, the slaves would toil to produce expensive cash crops that could not be grown in Europe. These raw materials were then refined and sold at fantastic profit in Europe. In 1697, the tiny island of Barbados with its 166 square miles, was worth more to British capitalism than New England, New York, and Pennsylvania combined, while by 1798, the income accruing to the British from the West Indian plantations alone was four million pounds a year, as opposed to one million pounds from the whole rest of the world. Capitalist economists of the day recognized the super profitability of slavery by noting the ease of making 100% profit on the trade, and by noting that one African slave was as profitable as seven workers in the mainland. Even more importantly, the profits of the slave trade were plowed back into further economic growth. Capital from the slave trade financed James Watt and the invention and production of the steam engine, while the shipping, insurance, banking, mining, and textile industries were all thoroughly integrated into the slave trade. What an analysis of the origins of modern capitalism shows is just how far the capitalist class will go to make a profit. The development of a pernicious racist ideology, spread to justify the uprooting and enslavement of millions of people to transport them across the world to fill a land whose indigenous population was massacred or worked to death, represents the beginnings of the system that George W. Bush defends as "our way of life". For revolutionaries today who seek to understand and transform capitalism and the racism encoded into its very being, it is essential to understand how and why these systems of domination and exploitation came into being before we can hope to successfully overthrow them.

#### Race and class are reproduced within capitalist relations – capitalism racializes subjects to force competition and divides social groups by obfuscating labor consciousness – this is a way to mask contradiction and maintain capital accumulation

San Juan 3 (E, Fullbright lecturer @ U of Leuven, Belgium, “Marxism and the Race/Class Problematic: A Re-Articulation”, <http://clogic.eserver.org/2003/sanjuan.html>)

It seems obvious that racism cannot be dissolved by instances of status mobility when sociohistorical circumstances change gradually or are transformed by unforeseen interventions. The black bourgeoisie continues to be harassed and stigmatized by liberal or multiculturalist practices of racism, not because they drive Porsches or conspicuously flaunt all the indices of wealth. Class exploitation cannot replace or stand for racism because it is the **condition of possibility** for it. It is what enables the racializing of selected markers, whether physiological or cultural, to maintain, deepen and reinforce alienation, mystifying reality by modes of commodification, fetishism, and reification characterizing the routine of quotidian life. Race and class are dialectically conjoined in the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation and domination. 30. We might take a passage from Marx as a source of guidelines for developing a historical-materialist theory of racism which is not empiricist but dialectical in aiming for theorizing conceptual concreteness as a multiplicity of historically informed and configured determinations. This passage comes from a letter dated 9 April 1870 to Meyer and Vogt in which Marx explains why the Irish struggle for autonomy was of crucial significance for the British proletariat: . . . Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the same as that of the 'poor whites' to the 'niggers' in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it (quoted in Callinicos 1993). Here Marx sketches three parameters for the sustained viability of racism in modern capitalist society. First, the economic competition among workers is dictated by the distribution of labor power in the labor-market via differential wage rates. The distinction between skilled and unskilled labor is contextualized in differing national origins, languages and traditions of workers, which can be manipulated into racial antagonisms. Second, the appeal of racist ideology to white workers, with their identification as members of the "ruling nation" affording--in W.E.B. DuBois's words--"public and psychological wage" or compensation. Like religion, white-supremacist nationalism provides the illusory resolution to the real contradictions of life for the working majority of citizens. Third, the ruling class reinforces and maintains these racial divisions for the sake of capital accumulation within the framework of its ideological/political hegemony in the metropolis and worldwide. 31. Racism and nationalism are thus modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history. No doubt social conflicts in recent times have involved not only classes but also national, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as feminist, ecological, antinuclear social movements (Bottomore 1983). The concept of "internal colonialism" (popular in the seventies) that subjugates national minorities, as well as the principle of self-determination for oppressed or "submerged" nations espoused by Lenin, exemplify dialectical attempts to historicize the collective agency for socialist transformation. Within the framework of the global division of labor between metropolitan center and colonized periphery, a Marxist program of national liberation is meant to take into account the extraction of surplus value from colonized peoples through unequal exchange as well as through direct colonial exploitation in "Free Trade Zones," illegal traffic in prostitution, mail-order brides, and contractual domestics (at present, the Philippines provides the bulk of the latter, about ten million persons and growing). National oppression has a concrete reality not entirely reducible to class exploitation but incomprehensible apart from it; that is, it cannot be adequately understood without the domination of the racialized peoples in the dependent formations by the colonizing/imperialist power, with the imperial nation-state acting as the exploiting class, as it were (see San Juan 1998; 2002). 32. Racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy (Wolf 1982; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). Solidarities conceived as racial or ethnic groups acquire meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these "racial" solidarities. Such patterns of economic and political segmentation mutate in response to the impact of changing economic and political relationships (Geshwender and Levine 1994). Overall, there is no denying the fact that national-liberation movements and indigenous groups fighting for sovereignty, together with heterogeneous alliances and coalitions, cannot be fully understood without a critical analysis of the production of surplus value and its expropriation by the propertied class--that is, capital accumulation. As John Rex noted, different ethnic groups are placed in relations of cooperation, symbiosis or conflict by the fact that as groups they have different economic and political functions.Within this changing class order of [colonial societies], the language of racial difference frequently becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. What the type of analysis used here suggests is that the exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to capitalism and that ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation. Race relations and racial conflict are necessarily structured by political and economic factors of a more generalized sort (1983, 403-05, 407). Hence race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. Corporate profit-making via class exploitation on an international/globalized scale, at bottom, still remains the logic of the world system of finance capitalism based on historically changing structures and retooled practices of domination and subordination.

#### Vote negative to adopt the historical material criticism of the 1NC - historical analysis of the material conditions of capital is the only way to break free from is contradictions and social inequalities it causes

Tumino 1 (Steven, teaches at the City University of New York, Spring, What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More Than Ever Before)

Any effective political theory will have to do at least two things: it will have to offer an integrated understanding of social practices and, based on such an interrelated knowledge, offer a guideline for praxis. My main argument here is that among all contesting social theories now, only Orthodox Marxism has been able to produce an integrated knowledge of the existing social totality and provide lines of praxis that will lead to building a society free from necessity. But first I must clarify what I mean by Orthodox Marxism. Like all other modes and forms of political theory, the very theoretical identity of Orthodox Marxism is itself contested—not just from non-and anti-Marxists who question the very "real" (by which they mean the "practical" as under free-market criteria) existence of any kind of Marxism now but, perhaps more tellingly, from within the Marxist tradition itself. I will, therefore, first say what I regard to be the distinguishing marks of Orthodox Marxism and then outline a short polemical map of contestation over Orthodox Marxism within the Marxist theories now. I will end by arguing for its effectivity in bringing about a new society based not on human rights but on freedom from necessity. I will argue that to know contemporary society—and to be able to act on such knowledge—one has to first of all know what makes the existing social totality. I will argue that the dominant social totality is based on inequality—not just inequality of power but inequality of economic access (which then determines access to health care, education, housing, diet, transportation, . . . ). This systematic inequality cannot be explained by gender, race, sexuality, disability, ethnicity, or nationality. These are all secondary contradictions and are all determined by the fundamental contradiction of capitalism which is inscribed in the relation of capital and labor. All modes of Marxism now explain social inequalities primarily on the basis of these secondary contradictions and in doing so—and this is my main argument—legitimate capitalism. Why? Because such arguments authorize capitalism without gender, race, discrimination and thus accept economic inequality as an integral part of human societies. They accept a sunny capitalism—a capitalism beyond capitalism. Such a society, based on cultural equality but economic inequality, has always been the not-so-hidden agenda of the bourgeois left—whether it has been called "new left," "postmarxism," or "radical democracy." This is, by the way, the main reason for its popularity in the culture industry—from the academy (Jameson, Harvey, Haraway, Butler,. . . ) to daily politics (Michael Harrington, Ralph Nader, Jesse Jackson,. . . ) to. . . . For all, capitalism is here to stay and the best that can be done is to make its cruelties more tolerable, more humane. This humanization (not eradication) of capitalism is the sole goal of ALL contemporary lefts (marxism, feminism, anti-racism, queeries, . . . ). Such an understanding of social inequality is based on the fundamental understanding that the source of wealth is human knowledge and not human labor. That is, wealth is produced by the human mind and is thus free from the actual objective conditions that shape the historical relations of labor and capital. Only Orthodox Marxism recognizes the historicity of labor and its primacy as the source of all human wealth. In this paper I argue that any emancipatory theory has to be founded on recognition of the priority of Marx's labor theory of value and not repeat the technological determinism of corporate theory ("knowledge work") that masquerades as social theory.

#### Historical materialism must come first - it predetermines consciousness and the very possibilities of reflective thinking

**Marx 1859** (Karl, a pretty important dude. “A Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy: Preface” http://www.marxists.org/archive/marx/works/1859/critique-pol-economy/preface.htm) JM

>edited for gendered language<

In the social production of their existence, [people] inevitably enter into definite relations, which are independent of their will, namely relations of production appropriate to a given stage in the development of their material forces of production. The totality of these relations of production constitutes the economic structure of society, the real foundation, on which arises a legal and political superstructure and to which correspond definite forms of social consciousness. The mode of production of material life conditions the general process of social, political and intellectual life. It is not the consciousness of [people] that determines their existence, but their social existence that determines their consciousness. At a certain stage of development, the material productive forces of society come into conflict with the existing relations of production or – this merely expresses the same thing in legal terms – with the property relations within the framework of which they have operated hitherto. From forms of development of the productive forces these relations turn into their fetters. Then begins an era of social revolution. The changes in the economic foundation lead sooner or later to the transformation of the whole immense superstructure. In studying such transformations it is always necessary to distinguish between the material transformation of the economic conditions of production, which can be determined with the precision of natural science, and the legal, political, religious, artistic or philosophic – in short, ideological forms in which [people] become conscious of this conflict and fight it out. Just as one does not judge an individual by what he thinks about himself, so one cannot judge such a period of transformation by its consciousness, but, on the contrary, this consciousness must be explained from the contradictions of material life, from the conflict existing between the social forces of production and the relations of production. No social order is ever destroyed before all the productive forces for which it is sufficient have been developed, and new superior relations of production never replace older ones before the material conditions for their existence have matured within the framework of the old society.

### Case

#### Their elevation of personal narrative over policy deliberation is politically dangerous—their strategy is the same used by the Bush administration to justify invading Iraq—only a model of public argument which emphasizes clear rules and empirical analysis can create a successful framework for progressive politics

Tonn 5 (Mari Boor, Associate Professor of Communication at the University of Maryland, College Park, “Taking Conversation, Dialogue, and Therapy Public ,” Rhetoric & Public Affairs 8.3 (2005) 405-430)

This widespread recognition that access to public deliberative processes and the ballot is a baseline of any genuine democracy points to the most curious irony of the conversation movement: portions of its constituency. Numbering among the most fervid dialogic loyalists have been some feminists and multiculturalists who represent groups historically denied both the right to speak in public and the ballot. Oddly, some feminists who championed the slogan "The Personal Is Political" to emphasize ways relational power can oppress tend to ignore similar dangers lurking in the appropriation of conversation and dialogue in public deliberation. Yet the conversational model's emphasis on empowerment through intimacy can duplicate the power networks that traditionally excluded females and nonwhites and gave rise to numerous, sometimes necessarily uncivil, demands for democratic inclusion. Formalized participation structures in deliberative processes obviously cannot ensure the elimination of relational power blocs, but, as Freeman pointed out, the absence of formal rules leaves relational power unchecked and potentially capricious. Moreover, the privileging of the self, personal experiences, and individual perspectives of reality intrinsic in the conversational paradigm mirrors justifications once used by dominant groups who used their own lives, beliefs, and interests as templates for hegemonic social premises to oppress women, the lower class, and people of color. Paradigms infused with the therapeutic language of emotional healing and coping likewise flirt with the type of psychological diagnoses once ascribed to disaffected women. But as Betty Friedan's landmark 1963 The Feminist Mystique argued, the cure for female alienation was neither tranquilizers nor attitude adjustments fostered through psychotherapy but, rather, unrestricted opportunities.102 [End Page 423] The price exacted by promoting approaches to complex public issues—models that cast conventional deliberative processes, including the marshaling of evidence beyond individual subjectivity, as "elitist" or "monologic"—can be steep. Consider comments of an aide to President George W. Bush made before reports concluding Iraq harbored no weapons of mass destruction, the primary justification for a U.S.-led war costing thousands of lives. Investigative reporters and other persons sleuthing for hard facts, he claimed, operate "in what we call the reality-based community." Such people "believe that solutions emerge from [the] judicious study of discernible reality." Then baldly flexing the muscle afforded by increasingly popular social-constructionist and poststructuralist models for conflict resolution, he added: "That's not the way the world really works anymore . . . We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality—judiciously, as you will—we'll act again, creating other new realities."103 The recent fascination with public conversation and dialogue most likely is a product of frustration with the tone of much public, political discourse. Such concerns are neither new nor completely without merit. Yet, as Burke insightfully pointed out nearly six decades ago, "A perennial embarrassment in liberal apologetics has arisen from its 'surgical' proclivity: its attempt to outlaw a malfunction by outlawing the function." The attempt to eliminate flaws in a process by eliminating the entire process, he writes, "is like trying to eliminate heart disease by eliminating hearts."104 Because public argument and deliberative processes are the "heart" of true democracy, supplanting those models with social and therapeutic conversation and dialogue jeopardizes the very pulse and lifeblood of democracy itself.

#### In demanding a personal affirmation of narratives, the aff appropriates those narratives for selfish purposes that elevate the hegemonic expertise of the witness and recreate biopolitical control over the subject

Givoni 11 (Humanitarian Governance and Ethical Cultivation: Médecins sans Frontières and the Advent of the Expert-Witness Michal Givoni Department of Politics and Government, Ben Gurion University, Millennium: Journal of International Studies 40(1) 43–63)

In order to gain a fuller understanding of humanitarian ethics it is therefore neces- sary to bring to light what Thomas Osborne has defined, following Michel Foucault, as ‘those practices, ideals, norms and techniques through which agents [in this case, the humanitarian rescuers] seek to “stylize” their attributes such as to make themselves coherent subjects of conduct’.8 In this vein, the notion of humanitarian ethics that I attempt to elaborate here does not refer to the imperatives and deliberations that seek to guide relief activity and ensure that it works to the benefit of the victims. It points, rather, to the modes in which humanitarian actors fashion their bodily, psychic and discursive behaviours so as to bring them into line with abstract norms and obligations. According to this perspective, ethics primarily consists of a cultivation of conduct, or what Foucault has famously called a ‘care of the self’, which frames both the exercise of freedom and the exercise of responsibility, aligning the experience of subjectivity with the govern- ment of the subject.9 In this sense, it is a style of life – to use a term put forward by Arnold Davidson – which constitutes the ‘matrix for ... moralities’, producing subjectivities that sustain and pre-conform to ethical precepts.10 By tracking the ethical work that lies at the roots of humanitarianism ‘without borders’, I wish to show that what Foucault has termed ‘technologies of the self’ have been pivotal to contemporary non-governmental humanitari- anism.11 This does not entail that the humanitarian endeavour is, in the final account, a purely narcissistic one. It rather means that the care exercised by experts for their own moral being has become increasingly enmeshed with their concern for others, forming the condition and the medium for the effective realisation of a contemporary politics of pity.12 The case of MSF makes it possible to trace the contours of one of the ethical supple- ments that became fused with professional practices of aid. For MSF, the burden of humanitarian dilemmas, when properly assumed, has been commingled with the figure of the witness. This figure, as I will show in what follows, had to be made and main- tained, while crafting physicians as vigilant observers of distant suffering and as compel- ling, rather than simply credible, spokespersons of victims worldwide. The humanitarian witness has been more than just a source of testimony whose own existence could be taken for granted: the witness has been a character to take on, an appealing moral posi- tion that could be attained by undertaking voluntary relief action in the Third World, and later deliberations and outspoken statements in Western public spheres. In Foucault’s terms, the witness has been the telos of varying modes of self-formation adopted by humanitarian practitioners.13 It has been the product of a sustained cultivation of indi- vidual and collective selves that, much like the care of the self in antiquity explored by Foucault, was not geared towards a hedonistic stylisation of character, but rather towards the surpassing of one’s bounded existence, inextricably merging the practitioners’ desti- nies with those of distant victims.14 In order to draw out the full resonance of the ethical practices that set witnessing as an end in itself it is necessary to turn our gaze back to the 1970s, when humanitarianism ‘without borders’ was only beginning to take shape. This period of incubation provides a privileged window into the making of a ‘specific intellectual’;15 a valuable historical record of how the figure of an engaged expert that came to constitute a new point of relay between truth and politics was forged in the field of medical humanitarianism.16 Yet MSF’s effort to weave together witnessing and medicine as a means to transcend the confines of the latter also casts critical light on this new intellectual project. It discloses the hitherto neglected connections of the expert-witness to a neo liberal political rational- ity § Marked 10:52 § that mobilises the freedom and autonomy of individuals as prime resources for the redeployment on a global scale of an efficacious political power. The recognition that in humanitarian work it is not only ‘impossible ... to distinguish altruism from narcissism’, as James Dawes has put it, but also potentially detrimental to do so has important repercussions for our appraisal of both the morality and the politics of humanitarianism.17 What need to be addressed are the affinities of the humanitarian endeavour with a configuration of political power in which, in the words of Foucault, ‘technologies of domination of individuals over one another have recourse to processes by which the individual acts upon himself and, conversely, ... [in which] techniques of the self are integrated into structures of coercion’.18 While the concern of critics of humanitarianism has focused largely on its alignment with sovereign biopolitics19 and with a discriminatory politics of life,20 there exists also a different kind of power game that renders this form of global benevolence politically problematic, albeit in a less deci- sive way. If the humanitarian administration of bare life is currently anchored in the ethi- cal cultivation of enlightened experts, if control over and surveillance of the unruly global peripheries is achieved not only through care for endangered populations but also through care for disconcerted selves, then there is a need to further complicate the picture drawn by the critical accounts of humanitarianism. This article makes a first step in this direction, using the study of the early years of MSF as a basis for a revised analytics of humanitarian power. Without presuming to argue that the case of MSF is representative of other humanitarian organisations, a claim that would require a far broader investiga- tion of the humanitarian field, I wish to show that the ethics of this prominent and influ- ential humanitarian actor shed light on the discrepancies within the contemporary apparatus of humanitarian governance and point to the need to revisit our conceptions of its mechanisms. Moving beyond the topos of bare life and its emphasis on the clinical and depoliticised framing of the suffering body in humanitarian practice, this article shows that the affinity between humanitarianism, medicine and politics draws, to a no lesser extent, on the ‘pursuit of enlightened subjectivity’ for which medicine has become ‘a privileged site’.21

## 2NC

### Cap

#### Race and class are reproduced within capitalist relations – capitalism racializes subjects to force competition and divides social groups by obfuscating labor consciousness – this is a way to mask contradiction and maintain capital accumulation

San Juan 3 (E, Fullbright lecturer @ U of Leuven, Belgium, “Marxism and the Race/Class Problematic: A Re-Articulation”, <http://clogic.eserver.org/2003/sanjuan.html>)

It seems obvious that racism cannot be dissolved by instances of status mobility when sociohistorical circumstances change gradually or are transformed by unforeseen interventions. The black bourgeoisie continues to be harassed and stigmatized by liberal or multiculturalist practices of racism, not because they drive Porsches or conspicuously flaunt all the indices of wealth. Class exploitation cannot replace or stand for racism because it is the **condition of possibility** for it. It is what enables the racializing of selected markers, whether physiological or cultural, to maintain, deepen and reinforce alienation, mystifying reality by modes of commodification, fetishism, and reification characterizing the routine of quotidian life. Race and class are dialectically conjoined in the reproduction of capitalist relations of exploitation and domination. 30. We might take a passage from Marx as a source of guidelines for developing a historical-materialist theory of racism which is not empiricist but dialectical in aiming for theorizing conceptual concreteness as a multiplicity of historically informed and configured determinations. This passage comes from a letter dated 9 April 1870 to Meyer and Vogt in which Marx explains why the Irish struggle for autonomy was of crucial significance for the British proletariat: . . . Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social, and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude towards him is much the same as that of the 'poor whites' to the 'niggers' in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist class maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it (quoted in Callinicos 1993). Here Marx sketches three parameters for the sustained viability of racism in modern capitalist society. First, the economic competition among workers is dictated by the distribution of labor power in the labor-market via differential wage rates. The distinction between skilled and unskilled labor is contextualized in differing national origins, languages and traditions of workers, which can be manipulated into racial antagonisms. Second, the appeal of racist ideology to white workers, with their identification as members of the "ruling nation" affording--in W.E.B. DuBois's words--"public and psychological wage" or compensation. Like religion, white-supremacist nationalism provides the illusory resolution to the real contradictions of life for the working majority of citizens. Third, the ruling class reinforces and maintains these racial divisions for the sake of capital accumulation within the framework of its ideological/political hegemony in the metropolis and worldwide. 31. Racism and nationalism are thus modalities in which class struggles articulate themselves at strategic points in history. No doubt social conflicts in recent times have involved not only classes but also national, ethnic, and religious groups, as well as feminist, ecological, antinuclear social movements (Bottomore 1983). The concept of "internal colonialism" (popular in the seventies) that subjugates national minorities, as well as the principle of self-determination for oppressed or "submerged" nations espoused by Lenin, exemplify dialectical attempts to historicize the collective agency for socialist transformation. Within the framework of the global division of labor between metropolitan center and colonized periphery, a Marxist program of national liberation is meant to take into account the extraction of surplus value from colonized peoples through unequal exchange as well as through direct colonial exploitation in "Free Trade Zones," illegal traffic in prostitution, mail-order brides, and contractual domestics (at present, the Philippines provides the bulk of the latter, about ten million persons and growing). National oppression has a concrete reality not entirely reducible to class exploitation but incomprehensible apart from it; that is, it cannot be adequately understood without the domination of the racialized peoples in the dependent formations by the colonizing/imperialist power, with the imperial nation-state acting as the exploiting class, as it were (see San Juan 1998; 2002). 32. Racism arose with the creation and expansion of the capitalist world economy (Wolf 1982; Balibar and Wallerstein, 1991). Solidarities conceived as racial or ethnic groups acquire meaning and value in terms of their place within the social organization of production and reproduction of the ideological-political order; ideologies of racism as collective social evaluation of solidarities arise to reinforce structural constraints which preserve the exploited and oppressed position of these "racial" solidarities. Such patterns of economic and political segmentation mutate in response to the impact of changing economic and political relationships (Geshwender and Levine 1994). Overall, there is no denying the fact that national-liberation movements and indigenous groups fighting for sovereignty, together with heterogeneous alliances and coalitions, cannot be fully understood without a critical analysis of the production of surplus value and its expropriation by the propertied class--that is, capital accumulation. As John Rex noted, different ethnic groups are placed in relations of cooperation, symbiosis or conflict by the fact that as groups they have different economic and political functions.Within this changing class order of [colonial societies], the language of racial difference frequently becomes the means whereby men allocate each other to different social and economic positions. What the type of analysis used here suggests is that the exploitation of clearly marked groups in a variety of different ways is integral to capitalism and that ethnic groups unite and act together because they have been subjected to distinct and differentiated types of exploitation. Race relations and racial conflict are necessarily structured by political and economic factors of a more generalized sort (1983, 403-05, 407). Hence race relations and race conflict are necessarily structured by the larger totality of the political economy of a given society, as well as by modifications in the structure of the world economy. Corporate profit-making via class exploitation on an international/globalized scale, at bottom, still remains the logic of the world system of finance capitalism based on historically changing structures and retooled practices of domination and subordination.

#### Ethical obligation to reject capitalism

Zizek & Daly ‘4 (Slavoj, Prof. of European Graduate School, Intl. Director of the Birkbeck Inst. for Humanities, U. of London, and Senior Researcher @ Inst. of Sociology, U. of Ljubljiana, and Glyn, Professor Intl. Studies @ Northampton U., “Risking the Impossible” <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm>)

It is in the light of this more subtle perspective on the real that zizek has also revised his approach to the question of ideology. In the sublime object of ideology, zizek developed his famous inversion of the classical 'false consciousness' thesis. Thus ideology does not conceal or distort an underlying reality (human nature, social interests etc.) But rather reality itself cannot be reproduced without ideological mystification (zizek, 1989: 28). What ideology offers is the symbolic construction of reality – the ultimate fantasy – as a way to escape the traumatic effects of the real. Reality is always a 'virtual' take on the real; virtualization that can never fully overcome the real or achieve homeostasis. In the language of laclau and mouffe, this means that society as an integrated unity is universally impossible precisely because of the constitutive excess of the real qua the unmasterable negativity upon which every positivization finally depends. And it is here that ideology performs its supreme conjuring trick. What ideology aims at is a fantasmatic re-staging of the encounter with the real in such a way that the impossibility of society is translated into the theft of society by some historical other. In nazi ideology, for example, it is the contingent figure of the jew who is made directly responsible for the theft/sabotage of social harmony – thereby concealing the traumatic fact that social harmony never existed and that it is an inherent impossibility (1989: 125-7; 1993: 203-4). By imputing the status of the real to a particular other, the dream of holistic fulfilment – through the elimination, expulsion or suppression of the other – is thereby sustained. More recently, however, Zizek has developed a new twist to this perspective. Ideology not only constructs a certain image of fulfillment (Plato's City of Reason, the Aryan Community, multiculturalist harmony etc..), it also endeavours to regulate a certain distance from it. [4](http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#4) On the one hand we have the ideological fantasy of being reconciled with the Thing (of total fulfilment), but, on the other, with the built-in proviso that we do not come too close to it. The (Lacanian) reason for this is clear: if you come too close to the Thing then it either shatters/evaporates (like the frescoes in Fellini's Roma) or it provokes unbearable anxiety and psychical disintegration. Crucial here is the status of the category of the impossible For Zizek impossibility is not the kind of neutral category that we tend to find in Laclau and Mouffe (as in their impossibility-of-Society thesis) where it tends to connote a basic constitutive frontier of antagonism. Like the immanent markers of the Real, impossibility gets caught up in ideology and is configured in such a way that it both structures reality and determines the coordinates of what is actually possible. As Zizek argues in this book, beyond the prima facie ideological operation of translating impossibility into an external obstacle there is a further deeper stage to the operation: that is, the "very elevation of something into impossibility as a means of postponing or avoiding encountering it". Ideology is the impossible dream not simply in terms of overcoming impossibility but in terms of sustaining that impossibility in an acceptable way. That is to say, the idea of overcoming is sustained as a deferred moment of reconciliation without having to go through the pain of overcoming as such. The central issue is one of proximity; of maintaining a critical distance by keeping the Thing in focus (like the image on a screen) but without coming so close that it begins to distort and decompose. A typical example would be that of someone who fantasizes about an ideal object (a sexual partner, promotion, retirement etc.) and when they actually encounter the object, they are confronted with the Real of their fantasy; the object loses its ideality, The (ideological) trick, therefore, is to keep the object at a certain distance in order to sustain the satisfaction derived from the fantasy "if only I had x I could fulfil my dream". Ideology regulates this fantasmatic distance in order to, as it were, avoid the Real in the impossible: i.e. the traumatic aspects involved in any real (impossible) change. This allows for a more nuanced reading of ideologies. Let us take the case of an international crisis: the so-called "liberation of Kuwait" during the 1990s Gulf conflict. Here the ideological discourse tended to operate along the following tines: "we must achieve the liberation of Kuwait ... while recognizing that any true liberation (i.e. abolishing Kuwait's feudal dynasty and setting up democratic structures) is currently impossible." And do we not have something similar with the so-called New World Order? Any real (or indeed Real) attempt to establish such an order would inevitably require traumatic far-reaching changes: global democracy based on universal rights, popular participation, the eradication of poverty and social exclusion (etc.) as part of a genuine "reflexive modernization". However, what we actually have is the routine invocation of the New World Order in term of an indefinite ideal that functions precisely as a way of preventing any real movement towards it. In the Kantian terms of the sublime, any convergence with what might be called the Bush-Blair "axis of Good" would become an unbearable evil. So we have the same type of ideological supplement at work: "we are moving towards a New World Order that will not tolerate the Saddam Husseins of this world... while recognizing that a true New World Order (one that would be intolerant of all the autocrats, royal families and the corporate dictatorships of global capitalism) is currently/always impossible . . ." In this way, impossibility loses its innocence and, far from comprising a simple repressed dimension, is rather something that can be seen to function as an implicit-obscene ideological supplement in today's realpolitik. There is a further potential danger. This concerns especially orthodox trends in politically correct multiculturalism and their distortion of a certain type of alliance politics that seeks to establish chains of equivalence between a widening set of differential struggles around gender, culture, lifestyles and so on. While there is nothing wrong in principle with establishing such forms of solidarity, the problem arises where this type of politics begins to assume, in a commonsense way, a basic levelling of the political terrain where all groups are taken to suffer equally ("we are all victims of the state/global capitalism/repressive forces..."). In other words, there is a danger that equivalential politics becomes so distorted that it becomes a way of disguising the position of those who are truly abject: those who suffer endemic poverty, destitution and repressive violence in our world system. In this way, the abject can become doubly victimized: first by a global capitalist order that actively excludes them; and, second, by an aseptic politically correct "inclusivism" that renders them invisible inside its postmodern forest; its tyranny of differences. For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today's global capitalism and its obscene naturalization/anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture - with all its pieties concerning "multiculturalist" [6](http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#6) etiquette - Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called "radically incorrect" in the sense that it breaks with these types of positions [7](http://www.lacan.com/zizek-daly.htm#7) and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today's social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. There is a further potential danger. This concerns especially orthodox trends in politically correct multiculturalism and their distortion of a certain type of alliance politics that seeks to establish chains of equivalence between a widening set of differential struggles around gender, culture, lifestyles and so on. While there is nothing wrong in principle with establishing such forms of solidarity, the problem arises where this type of politics begins to assume, in a commonsense way, a basic levelling of the political terrain where all groups are taken to suffer equally ("we are all victims of the state/global capitalism/repressive forces..."). In other words, there is a danger that equivalential politics becomes so distorted that it becomes a way of disguising the position of those who are truly abject: those who suffer endemic poverty, destitution and repressive violence in our world system. In this way, the abject can become doubly victimized: first by a global capitalist order that actively excludes them; and, second, by an aseptic politically correct "inclusivism" that renders them invisible inside its postmodern forest; its tyranny of differences. For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### NO VALUE TO LIFE UNDER CAPITALISM

Dillon 99 Michael Dillon, University of Lancaster, “Another Justice” *Political Theory* Vol. 27, No. 2, Aprill 1999, JSTOR

Otherness is born(e) within the self as an integral part of itself and in such a way that it always remains an inherent stranger to itself." It derives from the lack, absence, or ineradicable incompleteness which comes from having no security of tenure within or over that of which the self is a particular hermeneutical manifestation; namely, being itself. The point about the human, betrayed by this absence, is precisely that it is not sovereignly self-possessed and complete, enjoying undisputed tenure in and of itself. Modes of justice therefore reliant upon such a subject lack the very foundations in the self that they most violently insist upon seeing inscribed there. This does not, however, mean that the dissolution of the subject also entails the dissolution of Justice. Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism. They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability. Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. Once rendered calculable, however, units of account are necessarily submissible not only to valuation but also, of course, to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing. Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust. However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure. But how does that necessity present itself? Another Justice answers: as the surplus of the duty to answer to the claim of Justice over rights. That duty, as with the advent of another Justice, is integral to the lack constitutive of the human way of being.

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### Ethics DA – We have ethical obligation to repudiate capitalism – this means any risk a link is a reason to reject the permutation

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, “Critique, Action, Liberation” p. 334-335)

An example from the sphere of personal morality should make the difference clear. When a friend, relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed it may seem unlikely, given this particular person’s past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over **our** capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is correct, we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations**.** I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but i remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death. Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community**.** If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinion of experts have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War, for example, millions of people in the united states taking to the streets in protest proved the “best and the brightest” in the white house, pentagon, and state department wrong. The “best and the brightest” according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist. To think in a utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental, indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial**.** What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” speech? What does an empirical of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx’s capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso’s Guernica? To the extend, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason by the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factural, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.

#### Their single-issue resistance provides a route for capitalism to co-opt their resistance – labor is the only issue that cannot be integrated and destroyed by capital

Meszaros 95 [Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition] p. 40

To aggravate the situation, everything is further complicated by the fact that it is not feasible to find partial solutions to the problems that must be faced. Thus, no ‘single issue’ can be realistically considered a ‘single issue.’ If nothing else, this circumstance has been forcefully highlighted by the disconcerting marginalization of the Green movement on the success of which so much hope has been placed in recent times, even among former socialists. In the past up to a few decades ago it was possible to squeeze out of capital what appeared to be significant concessions—such as relative gains for the socialist movement (which later turned out to be reversible both as legislative measures for working class action and as gradually improving standard of living), obtained through the defensive organizations of labour: its trades unions and parliamentary parties. These gains could be conceded by capital so long as they could be assimilated and integrated by the system as a whole and turned to its productive advantage in the course of its self-expansion. Today, by contrast, confronting even partial issues with any hope of success implies the necessity of challenging the capital system as such. For in our own historical epoch, when productive self-expansion is no longer a readily available way out of the accumulating difficulties and contradictions (hence the purely wishful thinking of getting rid of the black hope of indebtedness by ‘growing out of it’), the global capital system of necessity frustrates all attempts at interfering even to a minimal extent with its structural parameters. In this respect the obstacles to be overcome are actually shared by labour—that is, labour as the radical alternative to capital’s social metabolic order—and the ‘single issue’ movements. For the historic failure of social democracy clearly underlined that only integrable demands can gain legitimacy under the rule of capital. Environmentalism by its very nature—just like the great historic cause of women’s liberation—is non-integrable. Consequently no such cause will for the capital system conveniently fade way, irrespective of how many setbacks and defeats the politically organized forms of ‘single issue’ movements might have to suffer in the foreseeable future. However, historically/epochally defined non-integrability, no matter how important for the future, cannot guarantee success on its own. Switching the allegiance of disappointed socialists from the working class to so-called ‘new social movements’ (praised now in opposition to, and by discarding altogether the emancipatory potential of, labour) must be considered, therefore, far too premature and naive. Single issue movements, even if they fight for non-integrable causes, can be picked off and marginalized one by one, because they cannot lay claim to representing a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the given order as a mode of social metabolic control and system of societal reproduction. This is what makes focusing on the socialist emancipatory potential of labour more important today than ever before. For labour is not only non-integrable (in contrast to some historically specific political manifestations of labour, like reformist social democracy, which may be rightly characterized as integrable and indeed in the last few decades also completely integrated), but — precisely as the only feasible structural alternative to capital — can provide the comprehensive strategic framework within which all ‘single issue’ emancipatory movements can successfully make their common cause for the survival of humanity.

#### You cannot permute a method – it strips out all of the conceptual theory that allows us both understand the world and to create a praxis to end oppression

Tumino 1 [Stephen, Prof English at Pitt, ““What is Orthodox Marxism and Why it Matters Now More than Ever”, Red Critique, p. online]

Orthodox Marxism has become a test-case of the "radical" today. Yet, what passes for orthodoxy on the left—whether like Smith and Zizek they claim to support it, or, like Butler and Rorty they want to "achieve our country" by excluding it from "U.S. Intellectual life" ("On Left Conservatism"), is a parody of orthodoxy which hybridizes its central concepts and renders them into flexodox simulations. Yet, even in its very textuality, however, the orthodox is a resistance to the flexodox. Contrary to the common-sensical view of "orthodox" as "traditional" or "conformist" "opinions," is its other meaning: ortho-doxy not as flexodox "hybridity," but as "original" "ideas." "Original," not in the sense of epistemic "event," "authorial" originality and so forth, but, as in chemistry, in its opposition to "para," "meta," "post" and other ludic hybridities: thus "ortho" as resistance to the annotations that mystify the original ideas of Marxism and hybridize it for the "special interests" of various groups. The "original" ideas of Marxism are inseparable from their effect as "demystification" of ideology—for example the deployment of "class" that allows a demystification of daily life from the haze of consumption. Class is thus an "original idea" of Marxism in the sense that it cuts through the hype of cultural agency under capitalism and reveals how culture and consumption are tied to labor, the everyday determined by the workday: how the amount of time workers spend engaging in surplus-labor determines the amount of time they get for reproducing and cultivating their needs. Without changing this division of labor social change is impossible. Orthodoxy is a rejection of the ideological annotations: hence, on the one hand, the resistance to orthodoxy as "rigid" and "dogmatic" "determinism," and, on the other, its hybridization by the flexodox as the result of which it has become almost impossible today to read the original ideas of Marxism, such as "exploitation"; "surplus-value"; "class"; "class antagonism"; "class struggle"; "revolution"; "science" (i.e., objective knowledge); "ideology" (as "false consciousness"). Yet, it is these ideas alone that clarify the elemental truths through which theory ceases to be a gray activism of tropes, desire and affect, and becomes, instead, a red, revolutionary guide to praxis for a new society freed from exploitation and injustice. Marx's original scientific discovery was his labor theory of value. Marx's labor theory of value is an elemental truth of Orthodox Marxism that is rejected by the flexodox left as the central dogmatism of a "totalitarian" Marxism. It is only Marx's labor theory of value, however, that exposes the mystification of the wages system that disguises exploitation as a "fair exchange" between capital and labor and reveals the truth about this relation as one of exploitation. Only Orthodox Marxism explains how what the workers sell to the capitalist is not labor, a commodity like any other whose price is determined by fluctuations in supply and demand, but their labor-power—their ability to labor in a system which has systematically "freed" them from the means of production so they are forced to work or starve—whose value is determined by the amount of time socially necessary to reproduce it daily. The value of labor-power is equivalent to the value of wages workers consume daily in the form of commodities that keep them alive to be exploited tomorrow. Given the technical composition of production today this amount of time is a slight fraction of the workday the majority of which workers spend producing surplus-value over and above their needs. The surplus-value is what is pocketed by the capitalists in the form of profit when the commodities are sold. Class is the antagonistic division thus established between the exploited and their exploiters. Without Marx's labor theory of value one could only contest the after effects of this outright theft of social labor-power rather than its cause lying in the private ownership of production. The flexodox rejection of the labor theory of value as the "dogmatic" core of a totalitarian Marxism therefore is a not so subtle rejection of the principled defense of the (scientific) knowledge workers need for their emancipation from exploitation because only the labor theory of value exposes the opportunism of knowledges (ideology) that occult this exploitation. Without the labor theory of value socialism would only be a moral dogma that appeals to the sentiments of "fairness" and "equality" for a "just" distribution of the social wealth that does the work of capital by naturalizing the exploitation of labor under capitalism giving it an acceptable "human face."

#### Ethics DA – We have ethical obligation to repudiate capitalism – this means any risk a link is a reason to reject the permutation

Marsh 95 (James, Professor of Philosophy at Fordham University, “Critique, Action, Liberation” p. 334-335)

An example from the sphere of personal morality should make the difference clear. When a friend, relative, teacher, or minister counsels an alcoholic to confront her habit, she is not making a prediction. Indeed it may seem unlikely, given this particular person’s past history, that she will lick her habit. Nonetheless, the moral obligation to get over her habit remains. Similarly, an obligation exists to get over **our** capitalism as a social equivalent of drunkenness. If the argument of this chapter is correct, we cannot renounce such an attempt at transcendence without giving up on the ethical project or curtailing that project by confining it to the sphere of intimate, interpersonal relations**.** I am a good father or husband or lover in my private life, but i remain exploitative, cruel, and inhumane in my public, capitalistic life. Such ethical renunciation or curtailment is the death or mutilation of the human; denial of utopia is a living death. Ideologies of scientific elitism, therefore, as they function in capitalist society are correct if there is no such thing as ethical, constitutive reason operating in community**.** If such constitutive reason is possible and actual in human beings as human in community, then scientific elitism is false. Men and women acting democratically and participatively do have a capacity to understand themselves and their lives in a way that is cogent and in touch with reality. Indeed, many of the popular movements in Europe, England, and the United States in the last twenty years such as feminism, environmentalism, civil rights, and antiwar movements, often acting against the advice or opinion of experts have shown themselves to be right and effective. In the Vietnam War, for example, millions of people in the united states taking to the streets in protest proved the “best and the brightest” in the white house, pentagon, and state department wrong. The “best and the brightest” according to the standards of scientific elitism proved to be deluded. The presence of an ethical, political rationality in all of us as human invalidates scientific elitism at its core. As I am arguing it here, a fundamental link exists among dialectical phenomenology, ethical, constitutive rationality, and democracy. Philosophy and ethics, properly understood, are antielitist. To think in a utopian manner, then, about community and socialism is to free ourselves from the excessive hold that science and technology exert over our minds and imaginations. We begin to see that science and technology and expertise, even though they are legitimate within their proper domains, do not exhaust or monopolize the definition of reason and other forms of reason and knowledge that are more informative, profound, and fundamental, indeed, compared to certain expressions of art or ethics or philosophy or religion, science and technology are relatively superficial**.** What revelatory power does a scientific equation have compared to Hamlet’s “to be or not to be” speech? What does an empirical of human populations show me about human life compared to the insight of Marx’s capital? What can a factual study of war show about its horrors compared to Picasso’s Guernica? To the extend, therefore, that science and technology dominate in the twentieth century as not only the highest forms of reason by the only forms of reason, they shove other, more profound, more reflective, more fundamental forms of reason to the side and twentieth-century industrial society emerges as an inverted, topsy-turvy, absurd world. What seems normal, factural, rational, and sane in such a world is in fact abnormal, apparent, irrational, and absurd. We begin to suspect and see that science and technology appear as the highest and only forms of reason because capitalism has appropriated science and technology for its own ends as productive force and ideology. In science and technology capitalism has found the forms of rationality most appropriate for itself, perfectly manifesting it, mirroring it, and justifying it. In such an absurd, inverted topsy-turvy world, fidelity to the life of reason demands critique, resistance, and revolutionary transcendence. One has to pierce the veil of such a world, see through it as absurd rather than accepting it as normal and sane. The prevailing rationality is profoundly irrational.

#### Their single-issue resistance provides a route for capitalism to co-opt their resistance – labor is the only issue that cannot be integrated and destroyed by capital

Meszaros 95 [Istavan, Prof. Emeritus at Sussex, Beyond Capital: Towards a Theory of Transition] p. 40

To aggravate the situation, everything is further complicated by the fact that it is not feasible to find partial solutions to the problems that must be faced. Thus, no ‘single issue’ can be realistically considered a ‘single issue.’ If nothing else, this circumstance has been forcefully highlighted by the disconcerting marginalization of the Green movement on the success of which so much hope has been placed in recent times, even among former socialists. In the past up to a few decades ago it was possible to squeeze out of capital what appeared to be significant concessions—such as relative gains for the socialist movement (which later turned out to be reversible both as legislative measures for working class action and as gradually improving standard of living), obtained through the defensive organizations of labour: its trades unions and parliamentary parties. These gains could be conceded by capital so long as they could be assimilated and integrated by the system as a whole and turned to its productive advantage in the course of its self-expansion. Today, by contrast, confronting even partial issues with any hope of success implies the necessity of challenging the capital system as such. For in our own historical epoch, when productive self-expansion is no longer a readily available way out of the accumulating difficulties and contradictions (hence the purely wishful thinking of getting rid of the black hope of indebtedness by ‘growing out of it’), the global capital system of necessity frustrates all attempts at interfering even to a minimal extent with its structural parameters. In this respect the obstacles to be overcome are actually shared by labour—that is, labour as the radical alternative to capital’s social metabolic order—and the ‘single issue’ movements. For the historic failure of social democracy clearly underlined that only integrable demands can gain legitimacy under the rule of capital. Environmentalism by its very nature—just like the great historic cause of women’s liberation—is non-integrable. Consequently no such cause will for the capital system conveniently fade way, irrespective of how many setbacks and defeats the politically organized forms of ‘single issue’ movements might have to suffer in the foreseeable future. However, historically/epochally defined non-integrability, no matter how important for the future, cannot guarantee success on its own. Switching the allegiance of disappointed socialists from the working class to so-called ‘new social movements’ (praised now in opposition to, and by discarding altogether the emancipatory potential of, labour) must be considered, therefore, far too premature and naive. Single issue movements, even if they fight for non-integrable causes, can be picked off and marginalized one by one, because they cannot lay claim to representing a coherent and comprehensive alternative to the given order as a mode of social metabolic control and system of societal reproduction. This is what makes focusing on the socialist emancipatory potential of labour more important today than ever before. For labour is not only non-integrable (in contrast to some historically specific political manifestations of labour, like reformist social democracy, which may be rightly characterized as integrable and indeed in the last few decades also completely integrated), but — precisely as the only feasible structural alternative to capital — can provide the comprehensive strategic framework within which all ‘single issue’ emancipatory movements can successfully make their common cause for the survival of humanity.

#### 2. The divide and conquer link – Capitalism racializes subjects to divide social groups - a race and experience based epistemology and theory of oppression breaks down the concept of class as an all encompassing theory of exploitation that is the only way to enable the unification of the proleteriat

Zavarzadeh 3 (Mas’ud, “The Pedagogy of Totality” p.11-13, in “JAC: A Journal of Rhetoric, Culture, and Politics”, Volume 23.1, http://www.jaconlinejournal.com/archives/vol23.1.html)

The pedagogy of appearance focuses on cultural representation and the role of representation in constructing the represented. By centering teaching in the machinery of "representation,"it obliterates the objective. Reducing pedagogy to lessons in cultural semiotics, it makes "experi- ence" of the pleasures of "depthless" surfaces the measure of reality and thus obscures the social relations of production that are the material conditions of that experience. However, "This 'lived' experience is not a given, given by a pure 'reality,' but the spontaneous 'lived experience' of ideology in its peculiar relationship to the real" (Althusser 223). The ideological value of the concept of "experience" in de-concep-ualizing pedagogy will perhaps become more clear in examining the way bourgeois radical pedagogues, such as Giroux, deploy experience as an instance of spontaneity to eviscerate class as an explanatory concept by which the social relations ofproperty are critiqued. In his Impure A cts- a book devoted to marginalizing explanatory concepts and popularizing "hybrids" and that, in effect, justifies political opportunism in peda- gogy- Giroux repeats the claims of such other cultural phenomenologists as Stuart Hall, Judith Butler, and Robin Kelley that "class" is "lived through race" (28). Class, in other words, is an affect. He represents this affective view ofclass as epistemological resistance against class which, he claims, is a universal category that takes the "difference" ofrace out of class. As I have already argued, epistemology is used in mainstream pedagogy as a cover for a reactionary class politics that does several things, as Giroux demonstrates. First, it segregates the "black" proletariat from the "white" proletariat and isolates both :from other "racial" prole- tariats. In doing so, Giroux's pedagogy carries out the political agenda of capital - to pit one segment ofthe proletariat against the other and to tum the unity of the working class into contesting (race) "differences." Second, it rewrites the system of wage labor itself into a hybrid. Giroux's experience-ism obscures the systematicity of wage labor and argues that there is no capitalism operating with a single logic of exploitation. Instead, there are many, aleatory, ad hoc, local arrangements between employees and employers depending on the color of the worker not the laws ofmotion ofcapital. Third, it converts capitalism from an economic system based on the"exploitation"of humans by humans(wagelabor)- through the ownership ofthe means ofproduction-into an institution of cultural "oppression" based on "power." Fourth, since class is lived through race, it is not an objective fact (the relation of the worker to ownership ofthe means ofproduction) but a subjective experience. The experience of ("living") class through race, like all experiences, is contingent, aleatory, and indeterminate. Class (lived through the experi- ence of race) is thus reconstituted as contingent - an accident not a necessity of wage labor. Fifth, since capitalism is not a system but a series of ad hoc arrangements of exchange with various workers of diverse colors, it does not produce an objective binary class system but only cultural differences. One cannot, therefore, obtain objective knowledge of capitalism. There are, in short, no laws ofmotion ofcapital; there are only "experiences" ofwork influenced by one's color. Consequently, to say-as I have said-that capitalism is a regime ofexploitation is simply a totalitarian closure. We cannot know what capitalism is because, according to Giroux's logic, it is fraught with differences (ofrace) not the singularity of"surplus labor." In Giroux's pedagogy, there is no capital- ism ("totality"), only cultural effects of capitals without capitalism ("differences"). Giroux represents his gutting of class as a radical and groundbreaking notion that will lead to liberation ofthe oppressed. However, he never completes the logic of his argument because in the end it will de-ground his position and turn it into epistemological nonsense and political pantomime. Ifclass is a universal category that obliterates the difference of race, there is (on the basis of such a claim) no reason not to say that race is also a universal category because it obliterates the difference of sexuality (and other differences), which is, by the same logic, itself a universal category since it obliterates the difference of age (and other differences), which is itselfa universal category because it obliterates the difference of (dis)ability (and other differences), which is itselfa univer- sal category because it obliterates the difference of class (and other differences). In short, the social, in Giroux's pedagogy is a circle of oppressions, none of whose components can explain any structural relations; each simply absorbs the other ("class is actually lived through race," paraphrasing Giroux) and thus points back to itself as a local knowledge ofthe affective, difference, and contingency. Class explains race; it does not absorb it as an experience (see Butler, "Merely"), nor does i t reduce it to the contingencies o f ethnicities (Hall, "New") or urban performativities (Kelley, Yo '). To put it differently, since in this pluralism of oppressions each element cancels out the explanatory capacity of all others, the existing social relations are reaffirmed in a pragmatic balancing of differences. Nothing changes, everything is resignified. The classroom of experience reduces all concepts (which it marks as "grand narratives") to affects ("little stories") and, instead of explaining the social in order to change it, only "interprets" it as a profusion of differences. Teaching becomes an affirmation of the singular-as-is; its lessons "save the honor of the name" (see Lyotard, Postmodern 82). Giroux's program is a mimesis ofthe logic of the ruling ideology: as in all pedagogies of affect, it redescribes the relation of the subject of knowledge with the world but leaves the world itselfintact byreifying the signs of"difference" (see Rorty, Contingency 53, 73). The subject, as I will discuss later in my analysis ofCary Nelson's radical pedagogy, feels differently about itself in a world that remains what it was. Giroux is putting forth a class-cleansing pedagogy: he erases class from teaching in the name ofepistemology ("totalization"). But as I have already argued, epistemology is not an issue for Giroux; it is an alibi for hollowing out from class its economic explanatory power. Epistemology in bourgeois pedagogy is class politics represented as "theory"-whose aim is to tum class into a cultural aleatory experience. In Giroux's phenomenological experientialism, lived experience is an excuse for advancing the cause of capital in a populist logic (respect for the ineluctable "experience" of the student) so that the student, the future worker, is trained as one who understands the world only through the sense-able - his own "unique" experience as black, white, or brown; man or woman; gay or straight - but never as a proletariat: a person who, regardless of race, sexuality, gender, age, or (dis)ability has to sell his or her labor power to capital in order to obtain subsistence wages in exchange. Experience, in Giroux's pedagogy, becomes a self-protecting "inside" that resists world-historical knowledge as an intrusion from "outside"; it thus valorizes ignorance as a mark of the authenticity and sovereignty ofthe subject-as independence and free choice.

#### 3. The discourse link - Race is inherently related to existing material property relationships – they reduce racial oppression to discourse, without connecting it to the larger social structures of capitalism

Young 6 (Robert, Red Critique, Winter/Spring, “Putting Materialism back into Race Theory”, <http://www.redcritique.org/WinterSpring2006/puttingmaterialismbackintoracetheory.htm>)

In Goldberg, the obsession with autonomy engenders a reification of discourse and the political implications of this are quite revealing. For Goldberg, discourse—not class struggle—becomes the motor of history: "it is in virtue of racist discourse and not merely rationalized by it that such forced manipulations of individual subjects and whole populations could have been affected" (95). He continues: "[i]nstruments of exclusion—legal, cultural, political, or economic—are forged by subjects as they mould criteria for establishing racial otherness" (95). Racial alterity makes sense not on its own terms but in relation to "instruments of exclusion". However, to move beyond Goldberg, I suggest that these instruments, in turn, must be related to existing property relationships. In short, the logic of alterity justifies and hence assists in the maintenance of class generated social inequality. The preoccupation with "autonomy" and "racial discourse formation" makes it seem as if social life is a matter of "contingency". This view blocks our understanding of the one constant feature of daily life under capitalism: exploitation. Under capitalism, exploitation is a not a discursive contingency but a structural articulation, and this structure of exploitation underpins (post)modern social life. At the moment then, the discourse of autonomy displaces the structure of exploitation and, in this regard, I believe one can map out the ideological collusion taking place in race theory. As I pointed out earlier, the humanists posit the "uniqueness" of black subjectivity and now we can see the postmodern corollary which posits the "uniqueness" of racial discourse. I refer to these positions as the "pedagogy of autonomy" because both instruct subjects to value the local. In both instances, the discourse of autonomy provides an ideological framework for protecting the "unique" against its conceptual other—knowledge of the social totality. The pedagogues of autonomy assume that the "unique", in its immediacy to the concrete, provides access to the real and therefore grounds knowledge. These (anti-reductionist) pedagogues reduce knowledge to the concrete and, consequently, mystify our understanding of race because they disconnect it from larger social structures like class and ideology.

#### Formation of sex or gender as the basis of political identity is the process by which capitalism divides the working class to make resistance impossible. This guarantees that political demands are not elevated past the level of particularism and reaching the level of the bourgeoisie becomes the ultimate objective

Brown 93 (Wendy, Professor of Political Science at the University of California, Berkeley, “Wounded Attachments” Political Theory, Vol. 21, No. 3 (Aug., 1993), pp. 392-395, JSTOR, http://www.jstor.org/stable/191795)

Although this détente between universal and particular within liberalism is potted with volatile conceits, it is rather thouroughly unraveled by two features of late modernity, spurred by developments in what Marx and Froucault, respectively, reveal as liveralism’s compainion powers: capitalism and disciplinarity. On one side, the state loses even its guise of universality as it becomes ever more transparently invested in particular economic interests, political ends, and social formations. This occurs as it shifts from a relativley minimalist “night watchman” state to a heavily bureacratized, managerial, fiscally complex, and highly interventionist welfare-warfare state, a transmogrification occasioned by the combined imperatives of capital and the autoproliferating characteristics of bureacracy. On the other side, a range of economic and political forces increasingly disinter the liberal subject from substantive nation-state identification: deterritorializing demographic flows; disintegration from within and invasion from without of family and community as (relatively) autonomous sites of social production and identification; consumer capitalism’s marketing discourse in which individual (and subindividual) desires are produced, commodified, and mobilized as identities; and disciplinary productions of a fantastic arry of behavior-based identities ranging from recovering alchoholic professionals to unrepentant crack mothers. These disciplinary productions work to conjure and regulate subjects through classificatory schemes, naming and normalizing social behaviors as social positions. Operating through what Foucault calls “an anatomy of detail,” “disciplinary power” produces social identities (available for politicization because they are deployed for purposes of political regulation) that crosscut juridicial identities based on abstract right. Thus, for example, the welfare state’s production of welfare subjects – themselves subdivided through the socially regulated categories of motherhood, disability, race, age and so forth – potentially produce political identity through these categories, produce identities as the these categories*.* In this story, the always imminent but increasingly politically manifest failure of liberal universalism to be universal – the transparent fiction of state universality – combines with the increasing individuation of social subjects through capitalist disinternments and disciplinary productions. Together, they breed the emergence of politicized identity rooted in disciplinary productions but oriented by liberal discourse toward protest against exclusion from a discursive formation of universal justice. This production, however, is not linear or even but highly contradictory: although the terms of liberalism are part of the ground of production of a politicized identity that reiterates yet exceeds these terms, liberal discourse itself also continuously recolonizes political identity as political interest – a conversion that recasts politicized identity’s substantive and often deconstructive cultural claims and critiques as generic claims of particularism endemic to universalist political culture. Similarly, disciplinary power manages liberalism’s production of politicized subjectivity by neutralizing (re-depoliticizing) identity through normalizing practicies. As liberal discourse converts politcal identity into essentialized private interest, disciplinary power converts interest into normativized social identity manageable by regulatory regimes. Thus disciplinary power politicially neutralizes entitlement claims generated by liberal individuation, whereas liberalism poltiically neutralize rights claims generated by disciplinary identities. In addition to the formations of identity that may be the complex effects of disciplinary and liberal modalities of power, I want to suggest one other historical strand relevant to the production of politicized identity, this one hewn more specifically to recent developments in political culture. Although sanguine to varying degrees about the phenomenon they are describing, many on the European and North American Left have argued that identity politics emerges from the demise of class politics consequent to post-Fordism or pursuant to May 1968. Without adjudicating the precise relationship between the breakup of class politics and the proliferation of other sites of political identification, I want to refigure this claim by suggesting that what we have come to call identity politics is partly dependent on the demise of a critique of capitalism and of bourgeois cultural and economic values. In a reading that links the new identity cliams to a certain relegitimation of capitalism, identity politics concerned with race, sexuality, and gender will appear not as a supplement to class politics, not as an expansion of Left categories of oppression and emancipation, not as an enriching complexification of progressive formulations of power and person – all of which they also are – but as tethered to a formulation of justice which, ironically, reinscribes a bourgeois ideal as its measure. If it is this ideal that signifies educational and vocational opportunity, upward mobility, relative protection against arbitrary violence, and reward in proportion to effort, and if it is this ideal against which many of the exclusions and privations of people of color, gays and lesbians, and women are articulated, then the political purchase of contemporary American identity politics would seem to be achieved in part through a certain discursive renaturalization of capitalism that can be said to have marked progressive discourse since the 1970s. What this suggests is that identity politics may be partly configured by a peculiarly shaped and peculiarly disguised form of resentment – class resentment without class consiousness or class analysis. This resentment is displaced onto discourses of injustice other than class but, like all resentments, retains the real or imagined holding of its reviled subject – in this case, bourgeois male privileges – as objects of desire. From this perspective, it would appear that the articulation of politicized identities through race, gender, and sexuality require, rather than incidentally produce, a relatively limited identification though class. They necessarily rather than incidentially abjure a critique of class power and class norms precisely because the injuries suffered by these identities are measured by bourgeois norms of social acceptance, legal protection, relative material comfort, and social independence. The problem is that when not only economic stratification but other injuries to body and psyche enacted by capitalism (alientation, commodificiation, exploitation, displacement, disintegration of sustain, albeit contradictory, social forms such as familes and neighborhoods) are discursively normalized and thus depoliticized, other markers of social difference may come to bear an inordinate weight. Absent an articulation of capitlism in the political discourse of identity, the marked identity bears all the weight of the sufferings produced by capitalism in addition to that bound to the explicity politicized marking.

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### Case

#### Narratives support hegemonic structures- they link personal experience to universal unquestionable truth

Ewick and Silbey 95 (Patricia Susan S. Law & Society Review, 00239216, 19, Vol. 29, Issue 2)

In the previous section, we discussed how narratives, like the lives and experiences they recount, are cultural productions. Narratives are generated interactively through normatively structured performances and interactions. Even the most personal of narratives rely on and invoke collective narratives — symbols, linguistic formulations, structures, and vocabularies of motive — without which the personal would remain unintelligible and uninterpretable. Because of the conventionalized character of narrative, then, our stories are likely to express ideological effects and hegemonic assumptions.[ [10](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib10" \o "10)] We are as likely to be shackled by the stories we tell (or that are culturally available for our telling) as we are by the form of oppression they might seek to reveal. In short, the structure, the content, and the performance of stories as they are defined and regulated within social settings often articulate and reproduce existing ideologies and hegemonic relations of power and inequality. It is important to emphasize that narratives do more than simply reflect or express existing ideologies. Through their telling, our stories come to constitute the hegemony that in turn shapes social lives and conduct "The hegemonic is not simply a static body of ideas to which members of a culture are obliged to conform" (Silberstein 1988:127). Rather, Silberstein writes, hegemony has "a protean nature in which dominant relations are preserved while their manifestations remain highly flexible. The hegemonic must continually evolve so as to recuperate alternative hegemonies." In other words, the hegemonic gets produced and evolves within individual, seemingly unique, discrete personal narratives. Indeed, the resilience of ideologies and hegemony may derive from their articulation within personal stories. Finding expression and being refashioned within the stories of countless individuals may lead to a polyvocality that inoculates and protects the master narrative from critique. The hegemonic strength of a master narrative derives, Brinkley Messick (1988:657) writes, from "its textual, and lived heteroglossia … [, s]ubverting and dissimulating itself at every … turn"; thus ideologies that are encoded in particular stories are "effectively protected from sustained critique" by the fact that they are constituted through variety and contradiction. Research in a variety of social settings has demonstrated the hegemonic potential of narrative by illustrating how narratives can contribute to the reproduction of existing structures of meaning and power. First, narratives can function specifically as mechanisms of social control (Mumby 1993). At various levels of social organization — ranging from families to nation-states — storytelling instructs us about what is expected and warns us of the consequences of nonconformity. Oft-told family tales about lost fortunes or spoiled reputations enforce traditional definitions and values of family life (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Similarly, bureaucratic organizations exact compliance from members through the articulation of managerial prerogatives and expectations and the consequences of violation or challenge (Witten 1993). Through our narratives of courtship, lost accounts, and failed careers, cultures are constructed; we "do" family, we "do" organization, through the stories we tell (Langellier & Peterson 1993). Second, the hegemonic potential of narrative is further enhanced by narratives' ability to colonize consciousness. Well-plotted stories cohere by relating various (selectively appropriated) events and details into a temporally organized whole (see part I above). The coherent whole, that is, the configuration of events and characters arranged in believable plots, preempts alternative stories. The events seem to speak for themselves; the tale appears to tell itself. Ehrenhaus (1993) provides a poignant example of a cultural meta-narrative that operates to stifle alternatives. He describes the currently dominant cultural narrative regarding the United States's involvement in the Vietnam War as one that relies on themes of dysfunction and rehabilitation. The story, as Ehrenhaus summarizes it, is structured as a social drama which characterizes both the nation and individual Vietnam veterans as having experienced a breakdown in normal functioning only recently resolved through a process of healing. This narrative is persuasive because it reiterates and elaborates already existing and dominant metaphors and interpretive frameworks in American culture concerning what Philip Rieff (1968) called the "triumph of the therapeutic" (see also Crews 1994). Significantly, the therapeutic motif underwriting this narrative depicts veterans as emotionally and psychologically fragile and, thus, disqualifies them as creditable witnesses. The connection between what they saw and experienced while in Vietnam and what the nation did in Vietnam is severed. In other words, what could have developed as a powerful critique of warfare as national policy is contained through the image of illness and rehabilitation, an image in which "'healing' is privileged over 'purpose' [and] the rhetoric of recovery and reintegration subverts the emergence of rhetoric that seeks to examine the reasons that recovery is even necessary" (Ehrenhaus 1993:83). Constituent and distinctive features of narratives make them particularly potent forms of social control and ideological penetration and homogenization. In part, their potency derives from the fact that narratives put "forth powerful and persuasive truth claims — claims about appropriate behavior and values — that are shielded from testing or debate" (Witten 1993:105). Performative features of narrative such as repetition, vivid concrete details, particularity of characters, and coherence of plot silence epistemological challenges and often generate emotional identification and commitment. Because narratives make implicit rather than explicit claims regarding causality and truth as they are dramatized in particular events regarding specific characters, stories elude challenges, testing, or debate. Van Dijk (1993) has reported, for instance, that stories containing negative images and stereotypes of nonwhite persons are less subject to the charge of racism when they recount personal experiences and particular events. Whereas a general claim that a certain group is inferior or dangerous might be contested on empirical grounds, an individual story about being mugged, a story which includes an incidental reference to the nonwhite race of the assailant, communicates a similar message but under the protected guise of simply stating the "facts." The causal significance or relevance of the assailant's race is, in such a tale, strongly implied but not subject to challenge or falsifiability. Thus representations, true and/or false, made implicitly without either validation or contest, are routinely exchanged in social interactions and thereby occupy social space. Third, narratives contribute to hegemony to the extent that they conceal the social organization of their production and plausibility. Narratives embody general understandings of the world that by their deployment and repetition come to constitute and sustain the life-world. Yet because narratives depict specific persons existing in particular social, physical, and historical locations, those general understandings often remain unacknowledged. By failing to make these manifest, narratives draw on unexamined assumptions and causal claims without displaying these assumptions and claims or laying them open to challenge or testing. Thus, as narratives depict understandings of particular persons and events, they reproduce, without exposing, the connections of the specific story and persons to the structure of relations and institutions that made the story plausible. To the extent that the hegemonic is "that order of signs and practices, relations and distinctions, images and epistemologies … that come to be taken-for-granted as the natural and received shape of the world and everything that inhabits it" (Comaroff & Comaroff 1991), the unarticulated and unexamined plausibility is the story's contribution to hegemony. The following two examples drawn from recent sociolegal research illustrate the ways in which legally organized narrativity helps produce the taken-for-granted and naturalized world by effacing the connections between the particular and the general. Sara Cobb (1992) examines the processes through which women's stories of violence are "domesticated" (tamed and normalized) within mediation sessions. Cobb reports that the domestication of women's stories of violence are a consequence of the organization of the setting in which they are told: within mediation, the storyteller and her audience are situated within a normative organization that recognizes the values of narrative participation over any substantive moral or epistemological code or standard. Being denied access to any external standards, the stories the women tell cannot therefore be adjudged true or compelling. The stories are interpreted as one version of a situation in which "multiple perspectives are possible." Cobb demonstrates how this particular context of elicitation specifically buries and silences stories of violence, effectively reproducing women's relative powerlessness within their families. With women deprived of the possibility of corroboration by the norms of the mediation session, their stories of violence are minimized and "disappeared." As a consequence, the individual woman can get little relief from the situation that brought her to mediation: she is denied an individual legal remedy (by being sent from court to mediation) and at the same time denied access to and connections with any collective understanding of or response to the sorts of violence acknowledged by the law (through the organization of the mediation process). Through this process, "violence, as a disruption of the moral order in a community, is made familiar (of the family) and natural — the extraordinary is tamed, drawn into the place where we eat, sleep and [is] made ordinary" (ibid., p. 19). Whereas mediation protects narratives from an interrogation of their truth claims, other, formal legal processes are deliberately organized to adjudicate truth claims. Yet even in these settings, certain types of truth claims are disqualified and thus shielded from examination and scrutiny. The strong preference of courts for individual narratives operates to impede the expression (and validation) of truth claims that are not easily represented through a particular story. Consider, for example, the Supreme Court's decision in the McClesky case (1986). The defendant, a black man who had been convicted of the murder of a police officer, was sentenced to death. His Supreme Court appeal of the death sentence was based on his claim that the law had been applied in a racially discriminatory way, thus denying him equal protection under the law. As part of McClesky's appeal, David Baldus, a social scientist, submitted an amicus brief in which he reported the results of his analysis of 2,000 homicide cases in that state (Baldus 1990). The statistical data revealed that black defendants convicted of killing white citizens were significantly more likely to receive the death sentence than white defendants convicted of killing a black victim. Despite this evidence of racial discrimination, the Court did not overturn McClesky's death sentence. The majority decision, in an opinion written by Justice Powell, stated that the kind of statistical evidence submitted by Baldus was simply not sufficient to establish that any racial discrimination occurred in this particular case. The court declared, instead, that to demonstrate racial discrimination, it would be necessary to establish that the jury, or the prosecutor, acted with discriminatory purpose in sentencing McClesky.[ [11](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib11" \o "11)] Here, then, an unambiguous pattern of racial inequity was sustained through the very invocation of and demand for subjectivity (the jury's or prosecutor's state of mind) and particularity (the refusal to interpret this case as part of a larger category of cases) that are often embodied in narratives. In this instance, relative powerlessness and injustice (if one is to believe Baldus's data) were preserved, rather than challenged, by the demand for a particular narrative about specific concrete individuals whose interactions were bounded in time and space. In other words, the Court held that the legally cognizable explanation of the defendant's conviction could not be a product of inferential or deductive comprehension (Mink 1970; Bruner 1986). Despite its best efforts, the defense was denied discursive access to the generalizing, and authoritative, language of social logico-deductive science and with it the type of "truths" it is capable of representing. The court insists on a narrative that effaces the relationship between the particular and the general, between this case and other capital trials in Georgia. Further, the McClesky decision illustrates not only how the demand for narrative particularity may reinscribe relative powerlessness by obscuring the connection between the individual case and larger patterns of institutional behavior; it also reveals how conventionalized legal procedures impede the demonstration of that connection.[ [12](http://web.ebscohost.com.proxy.library.emory.edu/ehost/detail?vid=4&hid=106&sid=c00733b3-4acd-4926-b4f9-94f849d6e9f1%40sessionmgr109" \l "bib12" \o "12)] The court simultaneously demanded evidence of the jurors' states of mind and excluded such evidence. Because jury deliberations are protected from routine scrutiny and evaluation, the majority demanded a kind of proof that is institutionally unavailable. Thus, in the McClesky decision, by insisting on a narrative of explicit articulated discrimination, the court calls for a kind of narrative truth that court procedures institutionally impede. As these examples suggest, a reliance on or demand for narrativity is neither unusual nor subversive within legal settings. In fact, given the ideological commitment to individualized justice and case-by-case processing that characterizes our legal system, narrative, relying as it often does on the language of the particular and subjective, may more often operate to sustain, rather than subvert, inequality and injustice. The law's insistent demand for personal narratives achieves a kind of radical individuation that disempowers the teller by effacing the connections among persons and the social organization of their experiences. This argument is borne out if we consider that being relieved of the necessity, and costs, of telling a story can be seen as liberatory and collectively empowering. Insofar as particular and subjective narratives reinforce a view of the world made up of autonomous individuals interacting only in immediate and local ways, they may hobble collective claims and solutions to social inequities (Silbey 1984). In fact, the progressive achievements of workers' compensation, no-fault divorce, no-fault auto insurance, strict liability, and some consumer protection regimes derive directly from the provision of legal remedies without the requirement to produce an individually crafted narrative of right and liability.

#### Specific card for the 1AC. Placing blackness as oppositional denies it any existence independent of white supremacy and makes identity reliant on opression – this turns their aff

Pinn 4 (Anthony, Macalester College Professor of Religious Studies, Dialog: A Journal of Theology, Volume 43, Number 1, Spring 2004, '‘‘Black Is, Black Ain’t’’: Victor Anderson, African American Theological Thought, and Identity', pg.57-58, Wiley online Library)

This connection between ontological blackness and religion is natural because: ‘‘ontological blackness sig- nifies the totality of black existence, a binding together of black life and experience. In its root, religio, religion denotes tying together, fastening behind, and binding¶ together. Ontological blackness renders black life and experience a totality.’’13 According to Anderson, Black theological discussions are entangled in ontological blackness. And accordingly, discussions of black life revolve around a theological understanding of Black experience limited to suffering and survival in a racist system. The goal of this theology is to find the ‘‘mean- ing of black faith’’ in the merger of black cultural consciousness, icons of genius, and post-World War II Black defiance. An admirable goal to be sure, but here is the rub: Black theologians speak, according to Anderson, in opposition to ontological whiteness when they are actually dependent upon whiteness for the legitimacy of their agenda. Furthermore, onto- logical blackness’s strong ties to suffering and survival result in blackness being dependent on suffering, and as a result social transformation brings into question what it means to be black and religious. Liberative outcomes ultimately force an identity crisis, a crisis of legitimation and utility. In Anderson’s words:¶ Talk about liberation becomes hard to justify where freedom appears as nothing more than defiant self-assertion of a revolutionary racial consciousness that requires for its legitimacy the opposition of white racism. Where there exists no possibility of transcending the black- ness that whiteness created, African American theologies of liberation must be seen not only as crisis theologies; they remain theologies in a crisis of legitimation.14 This conversation becomes more ‘‘refined’’ as new cultural resources are unpacked and various religious alternatives acknowledged. Yet the bottom line remains racialization of issues and agendas, life and love. Falsehood is perpetuated through the ‘‘herme- neutic of return,’’ by which ontological blackness is the paradigm of Black existence and thereby sets the agenda of Black liberation within the ‘‘postrevolu- tionary context’’ of present day USA. One ever finds the traces of the Black aesthetic which pushes for a dwarfed understanding of Black life and a sacrifice of individuality for the sake of a unified Black ‘faith’. Yet differing experiences of racial oppression (the stuff of ontological blackness) combined with vary- ing experiences of class, gender and sexual oppres- sion call into question the value of their racialized formulations. Implicit in all of this is a crisis of faith, an unwillingness to address both the glory and guts of Black existence—nihilistic tendencies that, unless held in tension with claims of transcendence, have the potential to overwhelm and to suffocate. At the heart of this dilemma is friction between ontological blackness and ‘‘contemporary postmo- dern black life’’—issues, for example related to ‘‘selecting marriage partners, exercising freedom of movement, acting on gay and lesbian preferences, or choosing political parties.’’15 How does one foster balance while embracing difference as positive? Anderson looks to Nietzsche.

#### Their narratives of suffering produce flawed knowledge about the other and exclude those whose narratives aren’t about suffering, turning case

Brown 96 (Wendy is Professor of Women's Studies and Legal Studies, and is Co-Director of the Center for Cultural Studies at the University of California, Santa Cruz. The University of Chicago Law School Roundtable)

If, taken together, the two passages from Foucault we have been consider- ing call feminists to account in our compulsion to put everything about women into discourse, they do not yet exhaust the phenomenon of being ensnared 'in the folds of our own discourses.' For if the problem I have been discussing is easy enough to see--indeed, largely familiar to those who track techniques of co-optation--at the level of legal and bureaucratic discourse, **it is altogether more disquieting when it takes the form of regulatory discourse in our own sub- and counter-cultures of resistance . . . when confessing injury becomes that which attaches us to the injury, paralyzes us within it, and prevents us from seeking or even desiring a status other than injured.** In an age of social identification through attributes marked as culturally significant--gender, race, sexuality, and so forth--**confessional discourse, with its truth-bearing status in a post-epistemological universe, not only regulates the confessor in the name of freeing her** as Foucault described that logic, but extends beyond the confess- ing individual to constitute a regulatory truth about the identity group. **Confessed truths are assembled and deployed as "knowledge" about the group.** This phenomenon would seem to undergird a range of recurring troubles in feminism, from the "real woman" rejoinder to post-structuralist deconstructions of her, to totalizing descriptions of women's experience that are the inadvertent effects of various kinds of survivor stories. Thus, for example, the porn star who feels miserably exploited, violated and humiliated in her work invariably monopolizes the truth about sex work; as the girl with math anxieties constitutes the truth about women and math; as eating disor- ders have become the truth about women and food; as sexual abuse and viola- tion occupy the knowledge terrain of women and sexuality. In other words, even as feminism aims to affirm diversity among women and women's ex- periences, confession as the site of production of truth and its convergence with feminist suspicion and deauthorization of truth from other sources tends to reinstate a unified discourse in which the story of greatest suffering becomes the true story of woman. (I think this constitutes part of the rhetorical power of MacKinnon's work; analytically, the epistemological superiority of confes- sion substitutes for the older, largely discredited charge of false consciousness). Thus, the adult who does not suffer from her or his childhood sexual experi- ence, the lesbian who does not feel shame, the woman of color who does not primarily or "correctly" identify with her marking as such--these figures are excluded as bonafide members of the categories which also claim them. Their status within these discourses is that of being "in denial," "passing" or being a "race traitor." **This is the norm-making process in feminist traditions of "breaking silence" which, ironically, silence and exclude the very women these traditions mean to empower.** (Is it surprising, when we think in this vein, that there is so little feminist writing on heterosexual pleasure?) But **if these practices tacitly silence those whose experiences do not parallel those whose suffering is most marked** (or whom the discourse produces as suffering markedly), **they also condemn those whose sufferings they record to a** permanent identification **with that suffering**. Here, **we experience a temporal ensnaring in 'the folds of our own discourses' insofar as we identify ourselves in speech in a manner that condemns us to live in a present dominated by the past.** But what if speech and silence aren't really opposites? Indeed, **what if to speak incessantly of** one's **suffering is to silence the possibilities of overcoming it,** of living beyond it, of identifying as something other than it? **What if this incessant speech not only overwhelms the experiences of others, but alternative** (unutterable? traumatized? fragmentary? inassimilable?) **zones of one's own experience**? Conversely, what if a certain modality of silence about one's suffering--and I am suggesting that we must consider modalities of silence as varied as modalities of speech and discourse--is to articulate a variety of possibilities not otherwise available to the sufferer?

#### The aff controls who and what is considered a “legitimate” voice – this turns case and recreates oppression by casting those who narratives are told as passive subjects

**Darling-Wolf 98** (Phd candidate at the University of Iowa, Fabienne, “White bodies and feminist dilemmas: on the complexity of positionality. (Constructing (Mis)Representations). Journal of Communication Inquiry v.22.n4(Oct1998): pp410(16)

**If our position can render even well-intended and carefully crafted speech epistemologically dangerous and place it beyond our control,** **attempts to speak for others motivated by self-interest and/or ignorance can conceivably have even more damaging consequences**. Consciously or not, **our speech might not be as well intended as we claim**. Rey Chow's (1993) Maoist, described in her book Writing Diaspora, exemplifies how identification with the subaltern can be self-interestingly used by academics pressured to include issues of gender, race, or class into their work. Chow defines the Maoist as **a person who desires a social order opposed to the one supporting her undertaking but refuses to recognize her own complicity with it**. **Identifying with a generalized non-Western subaltern, the Maoist uses the subaltern as a "subject" to advance her career and places herself in a fraudulent position of self-subalternization employed to claim authority in academia**. **The urge to speak for the subaltern may also originate in** white Western **theorists' desire to assuage their guilt**. Such a desire is exemplified by a telling anecdote mentioned by both Sabina Sawhney (1995) and Dympna Callaghan (1995) in which two feminist publishing houses made special efforts to publish writings on the plight of Asian girls by a young theorist named Rahila Khan--until they found out that Khan was in fact a male, middle-class, white vicar from Brighton named Toby Forward. Callaghan interprets the publishing houses' participation in the masquerade as a sign of "white feminism's still troubled encounter with racial difference" (p. 198). **While attempting to "give Khan a voice," white feminists treated her as an anthropological case study of an "authentic" other, as exemplified by their constant requests for more "ethnic" writings. In their search for ethnic specimens to increase their own knowledge, white feminists were not ready to deal with the complexity of positionality and consequently eagerly participated in the commodification of ethnic identity. They contributed to "a fetishization of women of color that once again reconstitutes them as other caught in the gaze of white feminist desire**" (Friedmah 1995, 11). Like Costner, Western theorists are searching for the authentic other in ethnic difference and an idealized past. In Writing Diaspora, Chow (1993) quotes a sinologist complaining about the fact that Chinese writers are losing their heritage. She compares the orientalist's desire to save the perishing traditions of "native" cultures and the "culture collecting" tendencies of "new historicism" to the work of primatologists capturing specimens for the safe enjoyment of white audiences at home. She also notes that in East Asian studies, political and cultural difference is frequently used as a judgment of authenticity. "**Natives" of communist China are treated as communist specimens who ought to be faithful to their nation's official political ideology. This focus on authenticity and national identity is often accompanied by pressures to concentrate on the "internal" and specific problems of a culture and serves to gloss over the impact of imperialism**. "**Native others are thus put to the difficult task of "authentically" representing their culture. Like the white model on the cover of a Japanese magazine, they are forced to stage their "exoticism" and turned into cultural icons**. For instance, while she acknowledges that her work as a cultural critic is intimately related to her experience as an Asian American woman, Leslie Bow (1995) expresses her discomfort with the fact that her Asian body serves to authenticate her "knowledge claims" about Asian Americans, Asian women, and, to some extent, women of color within the academy. As she explains, "[This] makes me acutely aware that we can be positioned not only according to our own agenda, but to that of others" (pp. 41-42). Furthermore**, if the representation is judged inadequate--**that is, if their work does not fit the dominant group's nostalgic notion of authenticity--**native others are exposed to the danger of being charged with self-interest**. Chow mentions the case of the Chinese poet Bei Dao accused of being "supremely translatable" by a Western sinologist, or her own experience of being deemed not "really" Chinese. **Others, judged to be authentic enough by the dominant group, may become canonized in the academy and championed as a major cultural voice** (Lakritz 1995). **Those token "native informants" can be used to assuage the guilt** and hide the ignorance of a majority concerned with including multiculturalism in its curriculum, a majority that, **in the process of granting space to select informants, keeps control over the terms of the debate**. **Another side effect of this forced positioning is exclusion from the dominant discourse**. As Trinh Minh-ha (1992, 164) puts it, "We have been herded as people of color to mind only our own culture." Uma Narayan (1989) notes that **scholars of mixed ethnic and racial origin often see the "darker side" of their identity played up, while the fact that they are distanced from the groups they are supposed to represent is ignored.** On a more general level, Chow (1993) observes that the framing of Chinese literature as minority discourse impedes its ascension to the status of world literature, as the rhetoric of universals ensures its ghettoization. She maintains that Chinese literature is thus trapped in its minority status because it is that status that gives it legitimacy. Furthermore, Chow (1993) notes that within Chinese studies, **minority discourse is not simply a fight for the content of oppression but also a fight for the ownership of speaking**. She explains that male Chinese authors often denounce feminist scholarship in their efforts to defend tradition, sinocentrism, and heritage. By doing so, such authors claim the minority discourse for themselves and in turn relegate Chinese women to minority status within the field of Asian studies. Thus, a feminist perspective may be considered compromising for minority scholars who can easily be accused of cultural betrayal (Bow 1995; Zavella 1996). For instance, bell hooks has been accused of committing acts of betrayal when turning her feminist critique to African American males. She warns that such practices can lead to hazardous self-censorship within minority communities. As she notes, "**The equation of truth-telling with betrayal is one of the most powerful ways to promote silence**" (hooks 1994, 68). The claims of Japanese feminists have often similarly been dismissed as manifestations of Western influence (Fujieda and Fujimura-Fanselow 1995)--that is, as not "truly" Japanese (see also Gamham 1993). But while minority discourse can be a trap, it can also serve the interests of academics in the West. Chow (1993) charges Chinese intellectuals speaking within the American academy on behalf of the neglected other in China with a certain level of dishonesty, especially if the former do not acknowledge the privilege afforded by their position overseas. She notes that scholars working in Western institutions might have more in common with their white middle-class colleagues than with the women "back home" they are supposed to represent. As she writes, "**If it is true that 'our' speech takes its `raw materials' from the suffering of the oppressed, it is also true that it takes its capital from the scholarly tradition, from the machineries of literacy and education, which are affordable only to a privileged few**" (p. 114). Bow (1995) similarly questions the self-positioning of some scholars, including Trinh Minh-ha and Gayatri Spivak, as Third World cultural critics rather than Asian Americanists. She wonders about the effects of disavowing American national affiliation on the part of scholars benefiting from American resources. Finally, the fact that **the act of speaking itself is necessarily embedded in structures of domination and reinforces the speaker's authority over "subaltern subjects" spoken for or about** raises the question of whether the subaltern can ever speak. According to Spivak, she or he cannot. As Spivak puts it, "If the subaltern can speak then, thank God, the subaltern is not subaltern any more" (quoted in Chow 1993, 36). Thus, Spivak urges us to recognize the double bind of identification that either results in the subaltern's protection against her own kind (Dunbar saving the Lakota Sioux women from the patriarchal attitudes of the men in their own culture) or in the assimilation of her voice into the project of imperialism (Khan's "ethnic" writings embraced by white feminists).

#### Their insistence on focusing on chattel slavery forces black people into a group identity that has no purpose outside of victimhood and collecting the fruits of white guilt – leads to superficial reforms and undermines real justice.

Steele, Research Fellow at the Hoover Institution at Stanford University, ‘99

[Shelby, “The Age of White Guilt”, Harpers, 11-30-99,

http://www.cir-usa.org/articles/156.html]

Today the protest identity is a career advantage for an entire generation of black intellectuals, particularly academics who have been virtually forced to position themselves in the path of their university's obsession with "diversity." Inflation from the moral authority of protest, added to the racial preference policies in so many American institutions, provides an irresistible incentive for black America's best minds to continue defining themselves by protest. Professors who resist the Baldwin model risk the Ellisonian fate of invisibility. What happened in America to make the Baldwin model possible? The broad answer is this: America moved from its long dark age of racism into an age of white guilt. I saw this shift play out in my own family. I grew up watching my parents live out an almost perpetual protest against racial injustice. When I was five or six we drove out of our segregated neighborhood every Sunday morning to carry out the grimly disciplined business of integrating a lily-white church in the next town. Our family was a little off-color island of quiet protest amidst rows of pinched white faces. And when that battle was lost there was a long and successful struggle to create Chicago's first fully integrated church. And from there it was on to the segregated local school system, where my parents organized a boycott against the elementary school that later incurred the first desegregation lawsuit in the North. Amidst all this protest, I could see only the price people were paying. I saw my mother's health start to weaken. I saw the white minister who encouraged us to integrate his church lose his job. There was a time when I was sent away to stay with family friends until things "cooled down." Black protest had no legitimacy in broader America in the 1950s. It was subversive, something to be repressed, and people who indulged in it were made to pay. And then there came the sunny day in the very late sixties when I leaned into the window of my parents' old powder-blue Rambler and, inches from my mother's face, said wasn't it amazing that I was making $13,500 a year. They had come to visit me on my first job out of college, and had just gotten into the car for their return trip. I saw my mistake even as the words tumbled out. My son's pride had blinded me to my parents' feelings. This was four or five thousand dollars more than either of them had ever made in a single year. I had learned the year before that my favorite professor--a full professor with two books to his credit--had fought hard for a raise to $10,000 a year. Thirteen five implied a different social class, a different life than we had known as a family. "Congratulations," they said. "That's very nice." The subtext of this role reversal was President Johnson's Great Society, and beneath that an even more profound shift in the moral plates of society. The year was 1969, and I was already employed in my fourth Great Society program--three Upward Bound programs and now a junior college-level program called Experiment in Higher Education, in East St. Louis, Illinois. America was suddenly spending vast millions to end poverty "in our time," and, as it was for James Baldwin on his return from Paris, the timing was perfect for me. I was chosen for my first Upward Bound job because I was the leader of the campus civil-rights group. This engagement with black protest suddenly constituted a kind of aptitude, in my employers, minds, for teaching disadvantaged kids. It inflated me into a person who was gifted with young people. The protesting that had gotten me nowhere when I started college was serving me as well as an advanced degree by the time I was a senior. Two great, immutable forces have driven America's attitudes, customs, and public policies around race. The first has been white racism, and the second has been white guilt. The civil-rights movement was the dividing line between the two. Certainly there was some guilt before this movement, and no doubt some racism remains after it. But the great achievement of the civil-rights movement was that its relentless moral witness finally defeated the legitimacy of racism as propriety--a principle of social organization, manners, and customs that defines decency itself. An idea controls culture when it achieves the invisibility of propriety. And it must be remembered that racism was a propriety, a form of decency. When, as a boy, I was prohibited from entering the fine Christian home of the occasional white playmate, it was to save the household an indecency. Today, thanks to the civil-rights movement, white guilt is propriety--an utterly invisible code that defines decency in our culture with thousands of little protocols we no longer even think about. We have been living in an age of white guilt for four decades now.What is white guilt? It is not a personal sense of remorse over past wrongs. White guilt is literally a vacuum of moral authority in matters of race, equality, and opportunity that comes from the association of mere white skin with America's historical racism. It is the stigmatization of whites and, more importantly, American institutions with the sin of racism. Under this stigma white individuals and American institutions must perpetually prove a negative--that they are not racist--to gain enough authority to function in matters of race, equality, and opportunity. If they fail to prove the negative, they will be seen as racists. Political correctness, diversity policies, and multiculturalism are forms of deference that give whites and institutions a way to prove the negative and win reprieve from the racist stigma. Institutions especially must be proactive in all this. They must engineer a demonstrable racial innocence to garner enough authority for simple legitimacy in the American democracy. No university today, private or public, could admit students by academic merit alone if that meant no black or brown faces on campus. Such a university would be seen as racist and shunned accordingly. White guilt has made social engineering for black and brown representation a condition of legitimacy. People often deny white guilt by pointing to its irrationality--"I never owned a slave," "My family got here eighty years after slavery was over." But of course almost nothing having to do with race is rational. That whites are now stigmatized by their race is not poetic justice; it is simply another echo of racism's power to contaminate by mere association. The other common denial of white guilt has to do with motive: "I don't support affirmative action because I'm guilty; I support it because I want to do what's fair." But the first test of sincere support is a demand that the policy be studied for effectiveness. Affirmative action went almost completely unexamined for thirty years and has only recently been briefly studied in a highly politicized manner now that it is under threat. The fact is that affirmative action has been a very effective racial policy in garnering moral authority and legitimacy for institutions, and it is now institutions--not individual whites or blacks--that are fighting to keep it alive. The real difference between my parents and myself was that they protested in an age of white racism and I protested in an age of white guilt. They were punished; I was rewarded. By my time, moral authority around race had become a great and consuming labor for America. Everything from social programs to the law, from the color of TV sitcom characters to the content of school curricula, from college admissions to profiling for terrorists--every aspect of our culture--now must show itself redeemed of the old national sin. Today you cannot credibly run for president without an iconography of white guilt: the backdrop of black children, the Spanish-language phrases, the word "compassion" to separate conservatism from its associations with racism. So then here you are, a black American living amidst all this. Every institution you engage--the government, universities, corporations, public and private schools, philanthropies, churches--faces you out of a deficit of moral authority. Your race is needed everywhere. How could you avoid the aggressions, and even the bigotries, of white guilt? What institution could you walk into without having your color tallied up as a credit to the institution? For that matter, what political party or ideological direction could you pursue without your race being plundered by that party or ideology for moral authority? Because blacks live amidst such hunger for the moral authority of their race, we embraced protest as a permanent identity in order to capture the fruits of white guilt on an ongoing basis. Again, this was our first fall by our own hand. Still, it is hard to imagine any group of individuals coming out of four centuries of oppression and not angling their identity toward whatever advantage seemed available. White guilt held out the promise of a preferential life in recompense for past injustice, and the protest identity seemed the best way to keep that promise alive. An obvious problem here is that we blacks fell into a group identity that has absolutely no other purpose than to collect the fruits of white guilt. And so the themes of protest--a sense of grievance and victimization--evolved into a sensibility, an attitude toward the larger world that enabled us always and easily to feel the grievance whether it was there or not. Protest became the mask of identity, because it defined us in a way that kept whites "on the hook." Today the angry rap singer and Jesse Jackson and the black-studies professor are all joined by an unexamined